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In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, II,
Petitioner,

VS.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, and CHIEF JUSTICE FRANK CELEBREZZE, JUSTICE CLIFFORD BROWN, JUSTICE WILLIAM BROWN, JUSTICE ROBERT HOLMES, JUSTICE JAMES CELEBREZZE, JUSTICE RALPH LOCHER, JUSTICE A. WILLIAM SWEENEY,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. May a state supreme court disregard this Court's decision in *Schware* and distinguish among applicants for bar admission on grounds other than competency?

2. May a state supreme court, consistent with the equal protection clause, distinguish among equally qualified applicants for bar admission without examination solely on the basis of place of prior practice of law?

3. May a state supreme court, consistent with the equal protection clause, require an applicant to that state's bar to pass a bar examination when that court admits that the bar examination has no relationship to competency?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented I
Table of Authorities IV
Opinions Below 1
Jurisdiction 2
Constitution, Statutes and Rules Involved 2
Statement of the Case 7
Reasons for Granting the Writ of Certiorari 10

This Case Presents the Important Question as to Whether States May Impose Requirements For Bar Admission That Have No Relationship to Competency or Fitness to Practice Law 10

A. The Actual Purpose of the Challenged Rule Is to Restrict Competition, Not to Assure Competency or Fitness 11

B. Several Well Reasoned Cases Have Held Unconstitutional Irrational and Unfair Barriers to Bar Admission, Similar to the Ohio Rule 12

C. The Sixth Circuit Has Effectively Ignored the Schware Case Which Sets Forth the Requirements That Must Be Met Before Discrimination in Bar Admission Can Pass Constitutional Muster 15

1. The district court opinion does not set forth a rational connection between the challenged qualification and Petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law 16

a. Ohio does not limit practice by unadmitted corporate attorneys 17

b. The Ohio rules do not require that an attorney practice five years in a state where admitted in order to qualify for admission without examination 18

2. The Sixth Circuit opinion does not set forth a rational connection between the challenged qualifications and Petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law 19

a. The Rule does not encourage attorneys who come into Ohio with less than five years of legal practice to take the bar immediately 20

b. The Ohio Rule does not rationally further the purported state objective of encouraging immigration 21

c. The Sixth Circuit opinion ignores Rule VI, Section 5 22

Conclusion 23

APPENDICES:

I. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (April 3, 1984) A1

II. Opinion and Order of the United States District Court (January 27, 1983) A12

III. Judgment Entry of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Denying Petition for Rehearing (May 25, 1984) A22

IV. Opinion of the United States District Court of Maryland in *William Jensen v. Robert C. Murphy, et al.* (November 13, 1980) A23

V. Order of Dismissal of the United States District Court of Maryland in *William Jensen v. Robert C. Murphy, etc. et al.* (April 23, 1981) A54

VI. Opinion and Order of the United States District Court of Michigan in *Bruce Stein v. Mary S. Coleman, et al.* (March 12, 1932) A56

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Application of Brewer, 506 P.2d 676 (Alaska 1973) 15
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) 11
Jensen v. Murphy, Civ. No. HM80-608 (D.C. Md. 1980) 11, 14
Salibra v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 730 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1984) 1
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) 9
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) 15, 19, 23
Stein v. Coleman, 214 U.S.P.Q. 118 (W.D. Mich. 1982) 12, 13, 14
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) 22

Constitution, Statutes and Rules

United States Constitution, 14th Amendment 2
28 U.S.C. 1254 2
28 U.S.C. 1343 .... 2, 9
42 U.S.C. 1983 .... 3, 9
Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio .... *passim*

Other Authorities

Smith, *Time for a National Practice of Law Act*, 64 A.B.A. JOURNAL 557 (1978) 10
5 WRIGHT & MILLER FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Section 1357 9

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OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the Sixth Circuit denying rehearing and rehearing en banc is unpublished and is set forth in Appendix III. The Sixth Circuit Opinion affirming the trial court is reported at 730 F.2d 1059 and is set forth in Appendix I. The District Court Opinion dismissing the complaint is unreported and is set forth in Appendix II.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was entered on April 3, 1984. On May 25, 1984, the Sixth Circuit denied Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

United States Constitution: 14th Amendment, Section 1:

> All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

28 U.S.C. Section 1343(3):

> (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .
>
> (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;

42 U.S.C. Section 1983:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, Rule I, Section 9 and Rule VI:

RULE I

ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Section 9. Admission Without Examination

(A) An applicant for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination must file the following with the Clerk of this Court:

(a) an affidavit that the applicant has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this State;

(b) a certificate of admission as an attorney at law in the highest court of another state or in the District of Columbia;

(c) a certificate, signed by a judge of a court of record of the state from which he seeks admission, indicating that the applicant is of good moral character and is in good standing in the bar of that state;

(d) certificates evidencing education equal to the requirements prescribed by this Court for admission to the practice of law in effect at the time the applicant was admitted in such other state;

(e) evidence showing that the applicant has, while a nondomiciliary of Ohio and for at least five years, engaged in legal work outside Ohio of such character and description as shall satisfy this Court that the applicant possesses the legal skills deemed adequate for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination; or evidence showing that applicant has for at least five years, engaged in the full-time teaching of law at a law school referred to in Section 1(D) of this rule;

(f) a certificate by an attorney at law of this State, who will present the applicant to this court pursuant to paragraph (B) of this rule, that the applicant is of good moral character and recommending him for admission to the practice of law in Ohio;

(g) applicant's affidavit that he is a citizen of the United States and that he is a resident of this State or intends to come into the State for the purpose of making it his permanent residence (if the applicant is not a resident of Ohio, his certificate shall not be issued until he has established residence in this State);

(h) an application and questionnaire, in duplicate, for use by the National Conference of Bar Examiners in making a character investigation;

(i) a fingerprint identification card on the form used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(j) a nonrefundable fee of five hundred dollars;

(k) if the applicant's undergraduate and/or legal education was not received in the United States, a fee in the amount of three hundred dollars shall be required for evaluation of such education.

(B) Each applicant under this rule shall be presented to this Court in regular session by an attorney at law of this State. Upon receipt of the complete application pursuant to Division (A) of this rule, the Clerk of Court shall schedule said presentation and notify the applicant of the date and time of said presentation. It shall be the applicant's responsibility to notify the presenting attorney. The presentation shall be allotted five minutes and the applicant and presenting attorney shall appear in person.

(C) This Court shall pass on the application, and the Clerk shall notify the applicant of the Court's approval or disapproval.

(D) An applicant under this section shall not engage in the practice of law in this State prior to the filing of his application. To do so constitutes the unauthorized practice of law and will result in a denial of the application. This paragraph (D) does not apply to participation by a nonresident of Ohio in a cause being litigated in this State when such participation is with leave of the judge hearing such cause.

(E) An applicant who has taken and failed to pass an Ohio bar examination may not be admitted to the practice of law under this rule.

Rule VI

REGISTRATION OF ATTORNEYS

(1) Every attorney at law admitted to the practice of law in the State of Ohio shall file with the Clerk of this Court a Certificate of Registration together with a registration fee of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per year payable biennially, upon a form to be furnished by the Clerk, said sum to be used for investigation of

complaints of alleged misconduct pursuant to Section (3) of Rule V of these rules, and Rule II of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary, alleged unauthorized practice of law and such other purposes deemed necessary by the Supreme Court of Ohio for the Government of the Bar and of the Judiciary of Ohio.

(2) The Certificate of Registration shall be filed and the registration fee paid on or before September 1, 1983, and shall be for the period of September 1, 1983, to August 31, 1985.

(3) Thereafter, in each odd-numbered year, a new Certificate of Registration shall be filed and the registration fee paid on or before September 1 of that year.

(4) Persons admitted to the practice of law in this State between biennial registration dates shall file a Certificate of Registration at the time of admission and pay a fee of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), unless such admission and registration occurs during the second year of the biennial registration period, in which event the fee shall be Fifty Dollars ($50.00).

(5) Every attorney admitted to the practice of law in another State but not in Ohio who performs legal services in this state solely for his employer as a full-time employee shall also file a Certificate of Registration and pay the fee as required by the foregoing sections of this rule. Said registration shall continue in force only so long as such attorney is so employed.

(6) An attorney who has not filed a Certificate of Registration and paid the required fee who practices law or holds himself out as authorized to practice law or who holds judicial office in this state shall be sub-

ject to disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule V of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio or Rule II of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary of Ohio.

(7) Any attorney admitted to the practice of law in Ohio may acquire inactive status by making application to the Clerk for exemption from payment of the registration fee at the time of filing his Certificate of Registration. Such inactive attorney shall not be entitled to practice law nor hold himself out as authorized to practice law nor hold judicial office in this State until such time as he requests and is granted reinstatement to active status.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Ohio Supreme Court[1] has promulgated a rule that permits some but not all experienced attorneys to become members of the Ohio bar without first passing the Ohio bar examination. The rule provides that any attorney who has been admitted to the highest court of any state and subsequently practiced law in any jurisdiction (whether or not admitted to the bar in that jurisdiction) for at least five years can be admitted to the Ohio bar without taking the bar examination *unless* the attorney has either lived or practiced in Ohio during any portion of that five year period.

Petitioner Lawrence A. Salibra, II graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1974, was admitted to the Wisconsin and Illinois Bars in 1974, and to the New York Bar in 1982; worked for a Chicago law firm

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1. Hereinafter the Ohio Supreme Court and its individual members will collectively be referred to as "Respondents."

from June, 1974, to November of 1976; and moved to Cleveland in 1976 to begin working as an attorney for Alcan Aluminum Corporation (hereinafter "Alcan"). He has been involved in a wide variety of legal work for Alcan including, but not limited to, state and federal litigation, local, state and federal tax matters, capital equipment acquisitions, environmental matters, personnel matters, loans, industrial bonds and other financings.

Petitioner realized that by virtue of Rule I, Section 9(A)(e) of the *Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio* (hereinafter "Rules") he was ineligible for admission to the Ohio bar without examination due *solely* to the fact that he lived in Ohio and engaged in legal work inside Ohio for a portion of the five year period. The Rule provides that:

> (A) An applicant for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination must file the following with the Clerk of this Court: . . .
>
> (e) evidence showing that applicant has, while a *nondomiciliary of Ohio* and for at least five years, *engaged in legal work outside Ohio* of such character and description as shall satisfy this court that the applicant possesses the legal skills deemed adequate for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination; or evidence showing that applicant has for at least five years, engaged in the full-time teaching of law at a law school referred to in Section 1(D) of this rule;

(Emphasis supplied.)[2]

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2. Rule I was amended since the filing of this action but none of the changes were relevant to this action except for the fact that the challenged portion of the Rule is now Section 9 rather than Section 8. All citations are to the current form of the Rules.

When his efforts to have Respondents voluntarily change the Rule proved fruitless, Petitioner filed suit in federal district court in Cleveland, Ohio. Jurisdiction was conferred on that court by 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 and the cause of action authorized by 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The complaint was filed on January 12, 1983, and requested the district court to issue a declaratory judgment that the challenged portion of Rule I, Section 9(A)(e) is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.[3] On January 27, 1983, Judge Manos dismissed the complaint *sua sponte* on the grounds that it failed to state a claim (A copy of his opinion is attached hereto as Appendix II.)

Petitioner appealed and on April 3, 1984, the Sixth Circuit affirmed (Appendix I) and on May 25, 1984, the petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc was denied (Appendix III). This petition then followed.

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3. Petitioner alleged in his complaint in district court that he met all other requirements for admission under Rule I, Section 9. Respondents have not challenged this allegation and, in any event, since the district court dismissed the case on Civil Rule 12(b)(6) grounds, "the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true." 5 WRIGHT & MILLER FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Section 1357, at 594. *See also Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THIS CASE PRESENTS THE IMPORTANT QUESTION AS TO WHETHER STATES MAY IMPOSE REQUIREMENTS FOR BAR ADMISSION THAT HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO COMPETENCY OR FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW.

While Americans are becoming more mobile, there still exist considerable economic pressures against easy mobility of professionals, especially attorneys. As a past president of the American Bar Association has pointed out: "Many of the states that have erected fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their own lawyers from professional competition." Smith, *Time for a National Practice of Law Act*, 64 A.B.A. JOURNAL 557, 557 (1978).

Among these "fences" are the artificial barriers that the private bar has erected against potential competitors from the corporate and federal bars. These barriers, often erected with the aid of the state judiciary, have the effect of reducing competition, decreasing competency and increasing costs to the consumer.

Now, however, corporate and federal attorneys are fighting back. While this is the first case to reach this Court, federal courts have already had to deal with challenges to similar rules promulgated in several other states. Since the lower courts have not reached consistent conclusions, and since the rules are so patently unfair, there is every reason to believe this issue will continue to face the federal judiciary unless this Court gives some guidance.

Accordingly, just as this Court held in *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) that the judiciary and private bar cannot combine to set prices, so too should it take this opportunity to hold that the judiciary and private bar cannot combine to keep federal and corporate attorneys from competing with private practitioners.

A. The Actual Purpose of the Challenged Rule Is to Restrict Competition, Not to Assure Competency or Fitness.

While Respondents and the lower courts have struggled mightily to construct a rational basis for Ohio's non-residency requirement, none of them has yet admitted what almost certainly is the true motivation behind the Rule—a fear of competition. Judge Murray in *Jensen v. Murphy*, Civ. No. HM80-608 (D.C. Md. 1980) pointed out very clearly why the private bar, aided by the state judiciary, has erected barriers against federal and corporate attorneys.[4]

> Regrettably, not all motivations behind restrictions on admission of out-of-state attorneys are laudable. In discussing the evolution of Rule 14 through the year 1967, William H. Adkins, II, a former Member of the Board, observed:
>
> > The unstated premise against liberal admission on motion is an economic one. It involves the fear of lawyers, especially those in the Washington suburban areas, that they will be immersed in a tidal wave of retired JAG officers, Department of Justice employees, and the like. Standards for

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4. That unpublished opinion is attached hereto as Appendix IV. The opinion was later withdrawn due to the fact that Maryland changed its rule and the Order of Dismissal is attached hereto as Appendix V.

> admission to the bar should not however, be based on a desire to suppress competition, a sort of protective tariff approach. The only permissible consideration . . . should be whether the application has sufficient professional experience to give a reasonable assurance of at least that degree of basic legal ability and perceptiveness measurable by a bar examination. . . .

Adkins, *What Doth the Board Require of Thee?* 28 MD. L. REV. 103, 112-113 (1968) (citation omitted).

Appendix IV at A31-A32.

While this fear of competition from corporate and federal attorneys may well be rational, it is not acceptable. Not only is there no connection to fitness or capacity to practice law, but indeed Respondents are actively seeking to keep fit and competent attorneys from entering the Ohio bar.

This Court should not acquiesce in the efforts of Respondents to attempt to keep the practice of law open to only a favored few and should instead reiterate that fitness and competency are the only valid requirements for bar admission. The writ of certiorari should be granted.

B. Several Well Reasoned Cases Have Held Unconstitutional Irrational and Unfair Barriers to Bar Admission, Similar to the Ohio Rule.

In a case virtually identical to this one, Judge Gibson of the Western District of Michigan struck down a Michigan Supreme Court rule comparable in effect to Ohio's. *Stein v. Coleman*, 214 U.S.P.Q. 118 (W.D. Mich. 1982).[5]

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5. The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently agreed to admit the plaintiff and change its rules. The opinion was then vacated as moot in the unpublished vacation order which is attached hereto as Appendix VI.

The *Stein* case involved a patent attorney employed by the Upjohn Company in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Michigan rule, as interpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court, denied Stein admission to the Michigan bar without examination solely because he had practiced patent law for three years in Michigan rather than outside of the state. *Id.* at 119. Judge Gibson rejected the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion using language that is directly applicable to the instant case.

> Defendants assert that, in view of the substantial interest of the state in prescribing the qualifications for admission to the bar, no constitutional claim is involved where a state declines to credit as the active practice of law the specialized practice of patent law which occurs within its borders. It may well be that the state's substantial interest leaves it free to decline to treat patent practice as the practice of law for purposes of state admission, but if it wishes to give credit for patent practice to some applicants and not others, it may have to justify the distinction drawn. As the Supreme Court said in *Konigsberg v. State Bar of California*, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957):
>
> > We recognize the importance of leaving states free to select their own bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner . . . .
>
> Plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to withstand the motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

214 U.S.P.Q. at 119.

Judge Gibson went on to point out that:

> The challenged classification credits patent practice outside the state as the active practice of law, but does

> not so recognize patent practice within the state. No rational connection between this classification and the state's interest in assuming [sic] attorney fitness has been advanced, and the Court's consideration of the matter has disclosed none. The practice of patent law involves the same drafting of applications, evaluating of inventions, prosecuting of patents, filing of amendments and appeals and arguments in support thereof, applying the same laws and procedures, in each state of the union.

Id. at 120.

The challenged Ohio Rule credits corporate legal practice outside Ohio but does not so credit corporate legal practice within the state. The practice of law for Ohio corporate attorneys does not differ from such practice done for corporations outside of Ohio. As the Sixth Circuit found (Appendix I at A7), there is no meaningful way to distinguish *Stein* and Petitioner respectfully submits that *Stein* should be followed.[6]

The opinion of Judge Murray in *Jensen* is also relevant. The Maryland rule required that an applicant for admission via a less comprehensive bar examination have practiced in the state where he or she was admitted. The court held that this rule violated the equal protection clause in that there is no rational reason to assume:

> that one who has practiced tax law for thirty years as a private practitioner in the District of Columbia and who is admitted to the District of Columbia bar

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6. Ironically and absurdly, Bruce Stein could have moved to Ohio and Petitioner to Michigan and each would have been admitted to the bar of his new state based upon his practice in Michigan and Ohio, respectively, even though neither man could be admitted to the bar of his original state because he had practiced there.

> is any more familiar with Criminal Law, Property, or Torts than an attorney with equivalent experience working for the Internal Revenue Service in Washington but not admitted to the District of Columbia bar.

Appendix IV at A30.

The attention of the Court is also drawn to *Application of Brewer*, 506 P.2d 676 (Alaska 1973), where the Alaska Supreme Court pointed out the lack of a rational basis to a rule that forbade Judge Brewer admission to the Alaska bar on the grounds that he had served as a judge in Alaska, while it would have granted him admission had he been a judge anywhere else. Again the analogy is clear—had Plaintiff been a corporate attorney anywhere but Ohio he could now be admitted to the Ohio bar without examination.

C. The Sixth Circuit Has Effectively Ignored the Schware Case Which Sets Forth the Requirements That Must Be Met Before Discrimination in Bar Admission Can Pass Constitutional Muster.

In 1957, this Court decreed that "any qualification [for the bar] must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners*, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). While both the Sixth Circuit (Appendix I at A6) and the trial court (Appendix II at A15-A16) paid lip service to this requirement, in fact both courts totally ignored *Schware*.

Rule I, Section 9 sets forth a number of requirements for admission to the bar without examination, and most of these requirements are obviously related to competency or fitness. These valid requirements include an affidavit

that the applicant not have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio (subsection a); admission to the bar in another state (subsection b); certification from a judge in that state that the applicant is of good moral character (subsection c); proof of educational preparation (subsection d); and a certificate from an Ohio attorney as to good moral character (subsection f).

In addition to these requirements, subsection (e) states that an applicant must have five years of legal experience and that that experience must have been gained while the applicant worked and lived outside of Ohio. The five years requirement is clearly related to competency and is not challenged here, but the requirements as to domicile and place of practice are very much at issue.

It is the contention of Petitioner that there is no rational connection between the domicile—place of practice requirement and Petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law. Moreover, while neither Respondents nor the lower courts have been able to demonstrate any such connection, the lower courts upheld the Rule nonetheless.

1. The district court opinion does not set forth a rational connection between the challenged qualification and Petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law.

The district court opinion sought to establish two rational bases for Rule I, Section 9(A)(e). The Court held that since Ohio law would not permit an unadmitted attorney to practice broadly it makes sense not to count such practice towards the five years requirement. The Court also stated that it is rational for the Ohio Supreme Court to assume that an attorney will gain broader experience if he practices where he is admitted. Whatever theoretical

merit these rationales might have in relation to the rules of another state, neither one has the slightest connection to the Ohio Rules.

a. *Ohio Does Not Limit Practice by Unadmitted Corporate Attorneys.*

The trial court claimed that "what plaintiff fails to realize, however, is that Ohio law carefully limits the type of legal work that can be performed by individuals not admitted to practice in Ohio." (Appendix II at A17). This statement is simply wrong.

Petitioner has registered with the Ohio Supreme Court under Rule VI, Section (5) which provides that:

> Every attorney admitted to the practice of law in another state but not in Ohio who performs legal services in this state solely for his employer as a full-time employee shall also file a Certificate of Registration and pay the fee as required by the foregoing sections of this Rule. Said registration shall continue in force only so long as such attorney is so employed.

The only limitation placed on corporate counsel registered under Rule VI(5) is that their legal work must be performed solely for their employer. Petitioner has engaged in a wide variety of legal work while employed by Alcan, and the trial court opinion fails to point out in what way this work differs in degree or kind from the legal services corporate attorneys employed in other states provide for their employers, or how Petitioner's work differs from that of an Ohio corporate attorney who is admitted to the Ohio Bar. In fact, there is no difference and there is no rational basis for the challenged Rule.

Furthermore, if an attorney were to practice law in Ohio without registering with the Ohio Supreme Court,

he or she would be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Rule VI(6) provides that:

> An attorney who has not filed a Certificate of Registration and paid the required fee who practices law or holds judicial office in this state shall be subject to disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule V of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio.

Thus the trial court clearly misstated the facts when it opined that "Ohio law carefully limits the type of legal work that can be performed by individuals not admitted to practice in Ohio." An attorney not admitted in Ohio and not registered under Rule VI would find that he is not merely *limited* in what he could do—he is *forbidden* from doing any legal work for anyone other than himself.[7] On the other hand, an attorney registered under Rule VI(5) is limited only in that he must perform his legal work solely for his employer—hardly a unique or significant limitation.

b. *The Ohio Rules Do Not Require That an Attorney Practice Five Years in a State Where Admitted in Order to Qualify for Admission Without Examination.*

The trial court made another baseless assumption when it asserted that "it is safe to presume that, *in general*, an individual will gain broader and more valuable experience from legal work in a state to which he is admitted to practice." (Appendix II at A17, emphasis in original).

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7. This statement is not strictly true since attorneys employed by the Federal Government often live in Ohio and practice in the Ohio Federal Courts without being admitted to the Ohio bar, and in fact those attorneys have their own cause of action against these defendants.

Whatever the validity of this presumption, it is wholly irrelevant. The Ohio Rules do not require that the five years of practice be done in a state where the applicant is admitted. Rule I(9)(A)(b) merely states that the applicant must have been admitted to the highest court of another state (or the District of Columbia), not that he have practiced for five years in such state. Thus, if Petitioner had moved to Pittsburgh in 1976 and practiced law with Alcoa's legal department without being admitted to the Pennsylvania bar, he would now be eligible to move to Ohio and be admitted under Rule I(9). The trial court's presumption is irrelevant since it cannot form a basis, rational or otherwise, for the Rule challenged in this action.

It is clear then that the trial court, having badly misread the Rules before issuing its opinion,[8] was unable to meet the *Schware* test of finding a rational connection between the challenged requirements and Petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law.

2. The Sixth Circuit opinion does not set forth a rational connection between the challenged qualifications and Petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law.

Apparently recognizing the lack of foundation to the district court's opinion, the Sixth Circuit invented two new "rational" bases—neither of which is relevant to the Rule.

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8. It may well be giving the district court too much credit to state that it read the Rules. The opinion was issued *sua sponte* just fifteen days after the complaint was filed and before the Respondents had made any appearance in the case. Since the Rules, other than Rule I, Section 9(A)(e), are not cited in the opinion, and are so badly misinterpreted, it is likely that the trial court merely assumed it knew their content and never bothered to read them.

a. *The Rule Does Not Encourage Attorneys Who Come Into Ohio With Less Than Five Years of Legal Practice to Take the Bar Immediately.*

The Sixth Circuit opinion states that "[a] first rationale, noted by the District Court, is that the Ohio rule encourages attorneys who come into the state with less than five years of legal practice to take the bar immediately." (Appendix I at A6). There are at least three things fundamentally wrong with this statement.

First of all, the trial court's comment that the Rule encourages a corporate attorney who has recently taken a job with an Ohio corporation to take the bar was made in the context of that court's misinterpretation of the relevant rules. The district court's opinion states first that, "Ohio law carefully limits the type of legal work that can be performed by individuals not admitted to practice in Ohio." (Appendix II at A17). As pointed out in the preceding section, this is incorrect since a corporate attorney registered under Rule VI(5) is limited only in that he can work solely for his employer—a limitation that most law firms place on their associates and not a limitation on the *type* of legal work he can perform. It was with this incorrect factual predicate that the District Court went on to state that the Rule encourages a corporate attorney to take the bar.

Secondly, the claim that the Rule encourages an applicant to take the bar sounds suspiciously like Lewis Carroll in one of his more whimsical moments. Respondents have promulgated Rule VI(5) which permits and indeed encourages corporate and federal attorneys to practice law in Ohio for their entire professional careers without taking the Ohio bar examination. The Sixth Circuit makes no attempt to explain why such a rule exists if

Respondents indeed want to encourage such attorneys to take the bar examination soon after moving to Ohio. The explanation for this failure is that no rational explanation is possible—there is absolutely no reason for believing that Respondents care when or if corporate and federal attorneys take the Ohio bar examination, much less that Respondents would prefer such attorneys to take the examination "immediately."

Finally, the lack of rationality is demonstrated by the fact that Respondents, in their Sixth Circuit brief, were unable to bring themselves to claim that the purpose of the exclusion of Ohio-based corporate and federal attorneys from admission under Rule I(9)(A)(e) was to encourage those attorneys to promptly take the bar. If Respondents do not see this as a rational basis, then it is clearly inappropriate for the courts to do so.

b. *The Ohio Rule Does Not Rationally Further the Purported State Objective of Encouraging Immigration.*

The Sixth Circuit opinion had only two sentences setting forth what it viewed as its other rational basis. "The Ohio rule's classification also has the reasonable goal of encouraging experienced attorneys to come into Ohio to practice law. Such encouragement is not necessary for attorneys in Salibra's position who have already been practicing law in Ohio for at least five years." (Appendix I at A6-A7).

The Sixth Circuit did not attempt to demonstrate what connection not admitting attorneys with five years of practice in Ohio has with the purported goal of encouraging immigration. It is true that admitting these attorneys would not promote the objective of encouraging immigration. It is equally true that admitting these attorneys

would not hinder this objective. In short, distinguishing attorneys by place of practice or residence has no impact, positive or negative, on the stated state objective. But a distinction can only "survive [equal protection] scrutiny if the distinction it makes rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose." *Zobel v. Williams*, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982).

Even if it be admitted that a rational state objective is the encouraging the immigration of experienced, competent attorneys from other states, that goal simply has no bearing on a decision to bar experienced, competent attorneys from admission to the Ohio bar solely on the basis of where they may have lived or worked. Since the exclusion has no relationship to this purported objective, it violates the equal protection clause.

c. *The Sixth Circuit Opinion Ignores Rule VI, Section 5.*

There is only one possible explanation for the existence of Rule VI(5). The purpose of the bar examination is to protect the public against incompetent attorneys. Respondents, mindful of that responsibility, have determined that corporations are sophisticated enough consumers of legal services so as not to require that their attorneys have passed Ohio's bar examination, so long as the attorneys have been admitted to another state's bar. Furthermore, since such an attorney must register with Respondents, they can discipline him should the necessity arise.

The Sixth Circuit held that "Salibra is not being treated unequally [since] he has received special treatment for the past eight years" and thus he cannot now complain when this practice does not count towards his effort to be admitted without taking the bar (Appendix I at A7). This holding, based on Petitioner's being permitted to practice under Rule VI(5), once again overlooks

the purpose of bar admission—assuring that all attorneys are qualified—as well as ignoring the reality that Petitioner is being treated differently from every non-Ohio based corporate attorney in America who practices where he is not admitted and wishes to be admitted to the Ohio bar. Since Respondents have determined that five years of practice presumptively establishes competence, and since Petitioner has practiced for five years, Respondents have determined that Petitioner is competent. It is a non sequitur for Respondents or the Sixth Circuit to now say that he gained his competence due to what they see as special treatment. If he is competent he should be admitted—that is exactly what *Schware* teaches us.

CONCLUSION

Respondents have determined that attorneys who meet certain criteria can be admitted to the Ohio bar without taking the Ohio bar examination. While most of these criteria are clearly related to competency or fitness to practice law, the requirement that an attorney must have lived and practiced outside of Ohio has no relationship to competency or fitness.

Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the petition for certiorari so that he be given an opportunity to receive the equal protection of the laws.

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

(Filed April 3, 1984)

No. 83-3088

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, *et al.*,
Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.

Before: LIVELY, *Chief Circuit Judge;* KENNEDY, *Circuit Judge;* and TAYLOR, *District Judge.**

KENNEDY, *Circuit Judge.* This case involves a challenge to a rule of admission to the bar of the State of Ohio. Appellant Lawrence Salibra (Salibra) is an attorney, a member of the Wisconsin, Illinois and New York bars. He wishes to be admitted to practice law in Ohio without taking the Ohio Bar examination, but is precluded by a

*Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Salibra challenges the constitutionality of this rule on equal protection and right to travel grounds, asking for a declarartory judgment. The District Ccurt dismissed his claim *sua sponte* under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and we affirm.

Rule I, § 8[1] of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio governs admission to the bar without examination.[2] Subsection (A)(e) requires that the applicant furnish:

> (e) evidence showing that applicant has, *while a non-domiciliary of Ohio and for at least five years,* engaged in legal work *outside Ohio* of such character and description as shall satisfy this court that the applicant possess the legal skills deemed adequate for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

Salibra graduated from law school in 1974, practiced for a private firm in Illinois for two years, and then began work as corporate counsel for Alcan Aluminum Corp. in Cleveland, Ohio. He has continued to work for Alcan since 1976. Salibra has been able to practice law in Ohio for the last several years without being admitted to the bar by virtue of Ohio Supreme Court rule VII(5):[3]

> (5) Every attorney admitted to the practice of law in another state, but not in Ohio who performs legal services in this state solely for his employer as

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1. Now rule I, § 9.

2. Salibra maintains that he meets all the requirements for admission to the bar without examination except those contained in subsection (e).

3. Now rule VI(5).

a full-time employee shall also file a Certificate of Registration and pay the fee as required by the foregoing sections of this Rule. Said registration shall continue in force only so long as such attorney is so employed.

Salibra argues that rule I, § 8(A)(e) violates equal protection and denies him his right to travel because it requires five years of legal practice *outside* Ohio for admission without examination.

I.

In his brief Salibra argued that the District Court should not have dismissed his action *sua sponte* for failure to state a claim, without first having given him a hearing or a chance to submit a written argument. We recently disapproved of such *sua sponte* dismissals on the merits in *Tingler v. Marshall*, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).[4] Under *Tingler*, a district court, when faced

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4. *See Martin v. Johnson*, 471 F.2d 704, 705 (6th Cir. 1973) ("this Court does not encourage dismissal of a complaint without notice to the plaintiffs or without affording them an opportunity to be heard"); *Brown v. Strickler*, 422 F.2d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir. 1970) ("dismissals of suits under the Civil Rights Act without notice to the plaintiffs and without providing at least some opportunity to argue in opposition thereto are not favored"). Two other Circuits have adopted this rule: *Jefferson Fourteenth Assoc. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc.*, 695 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1983), and *Dodd v. Spokane County*, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968) (plaintiff should at least have opportunity to submit written arguments).

To the contrary are *Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc.*, 621 F.2d 556 (3rd Cir. 1980); *Leonhard v. U.S.*, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); and *Tamari v. Bache & Co.*, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 905 (1978), which hold that a district court does have the power to dismiss a complaint *sua sponte* for failure to state a claim without providing a hearing.

Tingler did not address, nor do we, *sua sponte* dismissals where the district court clearly lacks jurisdiction. *See Brown v. Strickler*.

with a complaint which it believes may be subject to dismissal, must:

(1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant;

(2) notify all parties of its intent to dismiss the complaint;

(3) give the plaintiff a chance to either amend the complaint or respond to the district court in its notice of intended *sua sponte* dismissal;

(4) give the defendant a chance to respond or file an answer to motions;

(5) if the claim is dismissed, state its reasons for the dismissal.

The District Court in Salibra's case omitted steps 2 through 4, and its dismissal was consequently improper under *Tingler*. Counsel for Salibra has requested by letter, however, that we decide the case on the merits. In view of this request and the posture in which the case reaches up, we will not remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings. The case was decided prior to our decision in *Tingler*, and is now before us fully briefed on the merits. The parties agree that the issues involve solely questions of law, fully reviewable by this court. In *Tingler* we criticized *sua sponte* dismissals on the merits as being ultimately wasteful of judicial resources. In the interest of conservation of those resources we now address the merits of Salibra's case.

II.

Salibra points out that if he had practiced law in any state other than Ohio for the past five years as a resident of any other state, he would now be eligible for

admission to the Ohio Bar without examination. Because he chose to practice in Ohio, however, he must now take the bar examination to become a member. He submits that this is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Salibra argues that the equal protection clause forbids Ohio from crediting only work done outside Ohio for admission to the bar without examination.

Salibra has the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the challenged classification. *Parham v. Hughes*, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).[5] The classification is not based on a "suspect class" or other immutable human attribute and does not involve a "fundamental right",[6] and so need have only a reasonable basis to pass constitutional muster. *Id.; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.*, 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); *Vance v. Bradley*, 440 U.S.

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5. *Parham v. Hughes* and other cases cited which deal with equal protection challenges refer generally to "state laws" and "legislative classifications". The rule at issue here was not enacted by the Ohio State legislature, but was rather promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court, also a popularly elected body, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. However, we believe that the same analysis applies here to state court-created rules as to state legislative enactments. The Supreme Court noted in *Konigsburg v. State Bar of California*, 366 U.S. 36, 45 (1961), which involved a challenge on grounds of violation of fourteenth amendment protection against arbitrary state action, "[t]he fact that [a] rule finds its source in the supervisory powers of the California Supreme Court over admissions to the bar, rather than in legislation, is not constitutionally significant." We believe that this distinction is likewise not significant for purposes of fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges. *See In Re Griffiths*, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); *Lowrie v. Goldenhersh*, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983); *Bashir v. Supreme Court of Ohio*, 652 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1981); *Hawkins v. Moss*, 503 F.2d 1171 (1974), *cert. denied*, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).

6. *Lowrie v. Goldenhersh*, 716 F.2d 401, 412 (7th Cir. 1983) (no fundamental right to be admitted to the bar without examination); *see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes*, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (performance of economic activity is not a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis).

93, 97 (1979); *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); *Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co.*, 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1910); *Lowrie v. Goldenhersh*, 716 F.2d 401, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1983). *See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners*, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) ("any qualification [for the bar] must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law").

We find that there is a rational basis for the Ohio Supreme Court's distinction between work performed inside Ohio under a special rule and work performed outside of Ohio. A first rationale, noted by the District Court, is that the Ohio rule encourages attorneys who come into the state with less than five years of legal practice to take the bar immediately. Although the state will permit an attorney to practice law for a corporate employer without admission to the bar, concerns of knowledge and competency in Ohio law argue for a policy encouraging these corporate employees to take the bar exam soon after arrival in the state. A policy which would allow such attorneys to gain admission without examination after five years of practice would encourage them to practice without taking the bar, and this could have an adverse effect on the level of competence in corporate practice. A state's interest in regulating the practice of law within its borders is compelling, because lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice. *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); *Bashir v. Supreme Court of Ohio*, 501 F.Supp. 288, 291 (S.D. Ohio 1980), *aff'd*, 652 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1981). *See In Re Griffiths*, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973); *Konigsberg v. State Bar of California*, 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961).

The Ohio rule's classification also has the reasonable goal of encouraging experienced attorneys to come into Ohio to practice law. Such encouragement is not necessary

for attorneys in Salibra's position who have already been practicing law in Ohio for at least five years.

Moreover, Salibra is not being treated unequally in this case. On the contrary, he has received special treatment for the past eight years. The Ohio rules generally require that all persons practicing law in Ohio be members of the Ohio Bar.[7] Salibra has been able to practice law in Ohio only by virtue of the special exception applicable to corporate lawyers under Rule VII, §5. The point here is not whether attorneys employed by corporations have any more or less experience than attorneys otherwise employed. The salient issue is rather that for the past eight years the Ohio Supreme Court has given Salibra special treatment not accorded most lawyers. Now Salibra argues that *because* Ohio has allowed him to practice for more than five years without being admitted to the bar, it must now grant him the additional benefit of admission without examination. We fail to see how Salibra, who has received special treatment to this time, can now be a victim of an equal protection violation.

Salibra cites *Stein v. Coleman*, 214 U.S.P.Q. 118 (W.D. Mich. 1982), a very similar case, in which a member of the Wisconsin Bar moved to Michigan to work as a patent attorney for a corporate employer. The attorney was allowed to practice in Michigan without admission to the bar by virtue of a Michigan rule allowing practice by corporate counsel.[8] Another Michigan rule[9] allowed admission without examination for attorneys who have "actively practiced law" for three of the five years preceding ap-

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7. Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, Rule I, § 1(E).

8. Rules for the Board of Law Examiners, Rule 5D.

9. Rule 5A(6)(a).

plication. The Michigan Board of Law Examiners denied the plaintiff's application for admission without examination on the grounds that he had not "actively practiced law" within the meaning of the rule by practicing in Michigan under the special provision for corporate employees.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Michigan Supreme Court, alleging equal protection and right to travel violations. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had failed to state a claim, but the District Court found that he had stated a claim. The court explained that there was no dispute that plaintiff was otherwise qualified for admission without examination, and would have been admitted had he engaged in patent law practice for a corporation for three years outside the State of Michigan. 214 U.S.P.Q. at 119.

We cannot agree with the court's reasoning in *Stein*. A plaintiff does not state a claim under the equal protection clause by showing that he has not been granted a particular privilege, when the privilege may be granted to others similarly situated. The lines drawn by a classification need not be perfect nor drawn with "mathematical certainty" in order to be constitutional. *Schweiker v. Wilson*, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981); *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. at 485; *Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co.*, 220 U.S. at 79. Perhaps a different result would obtain here if the state were to focus its rules so as explicitly to grant the privilege of admission without examination to attorneys who have practiced for a certain time as corporate employees under special provisions in another state while not admitted to that state's bar. It would be difficult to find a rational basis for such a rule. The Supreme Courts of Michigan and Ohio, however, simply have general rules that allow attorneys who have practiced elsewhere for a certain time to be admitted to the bar without examina-

tion. They have chosen not to examine the particulars of such non-domiciliary practice, but rather to rely upon the standards of admission and practice in those other states. Attorneys coming from other states who are similarly situated to Salibra may be advantaged by this rule, but the fact that a rule results in some inequity does not mean that it violates the Constitution. *Schweiker v. Wilson*, 450 U.S. at 234; *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. at 485; *Martin v. Walton*, 368 U.S. 25, 26 (1961); *Phelps v. Board of Education*, 300 U.S. 319, 324 (1936); *Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co.*, 220 U.S. at 79. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a rational basis for the rule, and we believe that there is.

III.

Salibra argues that the Ohio rule penalizes him for his choice of residency, thereby violating his right to travel. Proper invocation of the right to travel would require the state to show a compelling justification, rather than simply a rational basis, for its rule. *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). We find, however, that Salibra has not properly invoked this right.

The cases applying the right to travel doctrine involve laws which distinguished between newcomers to a state, who were denied fundamental rights, and residents of longer duration, who were accorded such rights. *See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County*, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Salibra claims that he is penalized by the Ohio classification, but, unlike the plaintiffs in the above cases, Salibra is not the victim of unequal treatment on the basis of the duration of his residency in Ohio. Instead he is penalized as compared with certain non-residents of Ohio, i.e., those who have practiced law

for at least five years outside of Ohio. Salibra here did not travel. He has been a resident of Ohio for some eight years, and, like any other Ohio resident who has not practiced law outside the state for at least five years, must take the examination to gain admission to the bar. Salibra cites to no case which finds a right to travel violation resulting from preferences given to *non*-residents.

Even state regulation of the practice of law which may inhibit travel does not per se constitute a constitutional violation. *See Lowrie v. Goldenhersh,* 716 F.2d 401, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1983) (rule requiring five years practice in licensing state for admission without examination valid); *Hawkins v. Moss,* 503 F.2d 1171, 1179 (4th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied,* 420 U.S. 928 (1975) (rule granting admission without examination only to members of bar in states granting reciprocity valid); *Moore v. Supreme Court of South Carolina,* 477 F.Supp. 527, 531 (D. S.C. 1977), *aff'd,* 577 F.2d 735 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 439 U.S. 984 (1978) (rule requiring graduation from ABA approved law school for admission valid).

The right to travel doctrine has been applied only to cases involving the denial of "vital benefits," *Califano v. Torres,* 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978), "fundamental rights" or "basic necessity of life," *City of Akron v. Beil,* 660 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1981); *Hayes v. Board of Regents,* 495 F.2d 1326, 1328 (6th Cir. 1974). The doctrine has been applied, for example, to welfare assistance in *Shapiro v. Thompson*; to voting rights in *Dunn v. Blumstein*; and to non-emergency hospitalization in *Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.* Requiring Salibra to sit for and pass a bar examination to obtain admission to the Ohio bar does not amount to a denial of a basis necessity of life or a fundamental right. *Lowrie v. Goldenhersh,* 716 F.2d at 412.

We find that Salibra has no cause of action under either an equal protection or a right to travel theory, and the District Court properly dismissed this claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). Because we find it unnecessary to remand the case for further proceedings we do not address Salibra's claim that the case should be heard by a different judge on remand.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court dismissing appellant's claim is affirmed.

APPENDIX II

Opinion and Order of the United States District Court

(Filed January 27, 1983)

No. C83-177

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, II,
Plaintiff,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, *et al.*,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

On January 12, 1983, plaintiff, Lawrence A. Salibra, II, filed the above-captioned case alleging that the Supreme Court of Ohio and the individual justices of that court violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[1]

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1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

Specifically plaintiff alleges that Rule 1, Section 8(A)(e)[2] of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio is unconstitutional because it permits certain attorneys who have been practicing law outside of Ohio to be admitted without examinations while denying "admission without examination" to attorneys who have been practicing law within Ohio. Plaintiff alleges that this provision violates his constitutional rights to equal protection of the law and freedom to travel through and across state lines. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202,[3] that Rule 1, Section

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2. Rule 1, Section 8(A) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio provides in pertinent part:

> (A) An applicant for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination must file the following with the Clerk of this Court:
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> . . . .
>
> (e) evidence showing that applicant has, while a non-domicilliary [sic] of Ohio and for at least five years, engaged in legal work outside Ohio of such character and description as shall satisfy this court that the applicant possesses the legal skills deemed adequate for admisssion to the practice of law in Ohio without examination; or evidence showing that applicant has for at least five years, engaged in the full time teaching of law at a law school referred to in Section 1(D) of this rule. . . .

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 provides:

> In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

28 U.S.C. § 2202 provides:

> Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.

8(A)(e) is unconstitutional. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.[4] For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957).

Plaintiff alleges the following in his complaint:

> 5. In May of 1974 the Plaintiff was graduated from the Wisconsin Law School. On May 31, 1974 he was admitted to the bar of the State of Wisconsin and was subsequently admitted to the bars of Illinois and New York on October 31, 1974 and November 23, 1982, respectively.
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> 6. From June of 1974 to November, 1976, Plaintiff was employed as an attorney in the Chicago office of the law firm of Sidley & Austin.
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> 7. Since November, 1976 Plaintiff has been employed by Alcan Aluminum Corporation as part of its legal department. He has worked in Cleveland for this entire period of time and has registered with the Supreme Court of Ohio pursuant to its rules.
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> . . . .
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> 9. The Defendant Supreme Court has promulgated various rules relating to the governance of the

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4. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 provides in pertinent part:

> (a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
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> . . . .
>
> (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. . . .

bar of the State of Ohio. Among these rules is Rule 1, Section 8: "Admission Without Examination."

. . . .

10. Plaintiff is able to comply with all parts of Rule 1, Section 8 with the exception of subpart A(e) and in fact was recently admitted into the New York state bar after complying with very similar New York reciprocity admission requirements.

11. Plaintiff would in fact comply with subpart A(e) were it not for the fact that said subpart requires that five years of legal work be done *outside* the state of Ohio while the applicant is a non-domiciliary of Ohio while Plaintiff has completed his five years of legal work while residing in Ohio and working in Cleveland, Ohio.

12. There is no rational basis for the Defendant to permit reciprocal admission of attorneys who have been practicing law outside of Ohio while at the same time denying such admission to attorneys who have been practicing law within the state.

13. The Plaintiff has been denied his constitutionally protected rights to the equal protection of the law and freedom to travel through and across state lines.

The court will address plaintiff's equal protection and freedom of travel claims separtely.

I.

Plaintiff first alleges that Rule 1, Section 8(A)(e) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Absent a demonstration by the plaintiff that the challenged classification is based on a suspect criteria

or the impairment of a fundamental right, a state's professional licensing statute is deemed constitutional *if it is rationally related to a valid state objective. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,* 353 U.S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 752 (1959). Ohio's state interest in promulgating Rule 1, Section 8(A)(e) is to protect the public and and [sic] to assure a competent bar. *Bashir v. Supreme Court of Ohio,* 501 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ohio 1980), *aff'd,* 652 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1981). *See also, Murphy v. State Board of Law Examiners,* 429 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Pa. 1977). As the district court stated in *Bashir*:

> The state has the power to require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in the law before it admits an applicant to the bar. States maintain power over admission of attorneys to the bar as an incident to their broader responsibility for keeping the administration of justice and the standards of professional conduct unsullied. *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,* 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S. Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957); *Ross v. Reda,* 510 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied* 423 U.S. 892, 96 S. Ct. 190, 46 L.Ed.2d 124 (1975). The only constitutional requirement is that the standards or qualifications required have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra.* A bar examination tests those skills and knowledge which have a logical, apparent relationship to those necessary to the practice of law. *Tyler v. Vickery,* 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied* 426 U.S. 940, 96 S. Ct. 2660, 49 L.Ed.2d 393 (1976).

501 F. Supp. at 291.

Rule 1, Section 8(A) provides in pertinent part:

> (A) An applicant for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination must file the following with the Clerk of this Court:
>
> . . . .
>
> (e) evidence showing that applicant has, while a nondomiciliary [sic] of Ohio and for at least five years, engaged in legal work outside Ohio of such character and description as shall satisfy this court that the applicant possesses the legal skills deemed adequate for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination; or evidence showing that applicant has for at least five years, engaged in the full time teaching of law at a law school referred to in Section 1(D) of this rule. . . .

It is clear that the portion of Section 8(A)(e) that requires five years of legal work as a prerequisite to admission without examination is rationally related to a legitimate state goal. Plaintiff, however, claims that the additional requirement of Section 8(A)(e)—that the five years of legal work be performed outside Ohio—has no rational basis, since a person who has engaged in legal work within Ohio is presumably more knowledgeable about Ohio law than a person who has worked outside Ohio. What plaintiff fails to realize, however, is that Ohio law carefully limits the type of legal work that can be performed by individuals not admitted to practice in Ohio. Thus, plaintiff's generalization about the experience from work performed inside Ohio being superior to the experience from work performed outside Ohio is in fact just opposite of the fact. First, it is safe to presume that, *in general,* an individual will gain broader and more valuable experience from legal work in a state to which he is admitted to practice. Consequently, in an effort to ensure that all

applicants for admission *without examination* possess a minimal level of competence, the state may, as a benchmark, refuse to consider legal work performed within Ohio. Moreover, any hardships this provision might work in individual cases are minimized by the fact that an individual can always take the Ohio bar examination. Second, Section 8(A)(e) encourages individuals, such as plaintiff, who come into Ohio with less than five years of legal work, to take the Ohio bar examination as soon as they begin their legal work within the state. Although these individuals may engage in some legal work in Ohio without being admitted to practice, the state certainly has a legitimate interest in preferring that even this legal work be performed by individuals who have passed the Ohio bar examination and become subject to the disciplinary rules of the Ohio bar. Since Rule 1, Section 8(A)(e) is rationally related to several valid state objectives, plaintiffs [sic] equal protection claim is without merit. *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,* 353 U.S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 752 (1959).

II.

Plaintiff's second claim is that Rule 1, Section 8(A)(e), violates his right to freedom of travel through and across state lines. In *Jones v. Helms,* ..... U.S. ....., 101 S. Ct. 2434, 2439-40 (1981), the United States Supreme Court reasoned:

> It is, of course, well settled that the right of a United States citizen to travel from one State to another and to take up residence in the State of his choice is protected by the Federal Constitution. Although the textual source of this right has been the subject of debate, its fundamental nature has consistently been recognized by this Court. See *Shapiro v. Thompson,*

> 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1328-1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; *United States v. Guest*, 383 U.S. 745, 757-759, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1177-1179, 16 L.Ed.2d 239. The right to travel has been described as a privilege of national citizenship, and as an aspect of liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever its source, a State may neither tax nor penalize a citizen for exercising his right to leave one State and enter another.

(Footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the right to travel does not imply that a citizen carries with him from state to state an absolute right to practice a profession. *Hawkins v. Moss*, 503 F.2d 1171, 1178-79 (4th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 420 U.S. 928, 95 S. Ct. 1127 (1975). *Accord*, *Lowrie v. Goldenhersh*, 521 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1981). In *Hawkins*, the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a South Carolina Supreme Court rule exempting from the bar examination only those attorneys admitted to practice in a state granting reciprocity to South Carolina lawyers. The court reasoned:

> The right of federal citizenship as reflected in the "right to travel" and as protected by this provision is not to be construed to mean that a citizen carries with him from state to state an absolute right of comity to practice, not a "common occupation", but a profession, which is properly subject to state regulation, in any state to which he travels, though this is essentially what the plaintiff, in the exposition of this contention, posits. The exercise by a state of power to regulate reasonably the practice of law within its jurisdiction and to require of any applicant, whether a resident or a migrant, that he demonstrate sufficient proficiency in the law as a prerequisite to a license to practice, is, as we have seen perfectly permissible and

> represents no violation of this provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]here is no condition on the appellant's actual right to travel; the only condition relates to his right to practice a constitutionally regulated profession within the state. The State had a perfect constitutional right to require of the appellant that he demonstrate his proficiency in the law by an examination; that it exempts from that requirement some applicants for reciprocity reasons which serve a legitimate "substantial" or "important" state interest does not operate to relieve the appellant of so demonstrating his proficiency.

503 F.2d at 1178-79. (Citations and footnotes omitted). Since admission to practice in one state is not automatic admission to practice in another state, *Hawkins,* 503 F.2d at 1175-76, *Lowrie v. Goldenhersh,* 521 F. Supp. at 537, and since plaintiff can still be admitted to practice law in Ohio by passing the Ohio bar examination, Rule 1, Section 8(A)(e) is not so burdensome as to constitute a "penalty" against the exercise of the constitutional right to travel.

Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See*: Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).[5]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOHN M. MANOS
United States District Judge

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5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides:

> Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,

(Continued on following page)

No. C83-177

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LAWRENCE A. SALIBR [sic], II,
Plaintiff,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, *et al.*,
Defendants.

ORDER

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Opinion issued in the above-captioned case, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOHN M. MANOS
United States District Judge

Footnote continued—

in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

APPENDIX III

Judgment Entry of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Denying Petition for Rehearing

(Filed May 25, 1984)

No. 83-3088

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, *et al.*,
Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: LIVELY, *Chief Judge*; KENNEDY, *Circuit Judge*; and TAYLOR, *District Judge.**

The Court not having favored rehearing en banc in this case, the petition for rehearing is referred to our panel for disposition.

Upon consideration, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be and hereby is DENIED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ JOHN P. HEHMAN
Clerk

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*Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

APPENDIX IV

Opinion of the United States District Court of Maryland in William Jensen v. Robert C. Murphy et al.

(Filed November 13, 1980)

Civil No. HM80-608

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

WILLIAM JENSEN

v.

ROBERT C. MURPHY, Chief Judge; MARVIN H. SMITH, Judge; J. DUDLEY DIGGES, Judge; JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, Judge; HARRY A. COLE, Judge; RITA C. DAVIDSON, Judge; LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, Judge; Court of Appeals of Maryland, Courts of Appeals Building, Annapolis, Maryland 21401; JERROLD V. POWERS, Chairman; CHARLES H. DORSEY, JR., Member; WILLIAM H. PRICE, II, Member; WILLIAM F. ABELL, JR., Member; DAVID C. DANEKER, Member; DIANE G. SCHULTE, Member; J. FREDERICK SHARER, Member; Maryland State Board of Law Examiners, The District Court Building, P.O. Box 1911, Annapolis, Maryland 21404

Plaintiff, formerly a federal administrative law judge (ALJ), brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Rule 14a(iii)[1] of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.[2] Defendants are the Judges of the Court of

Appeals,[3] which pursuant to Maryland statute[4] promulgates rules and regulations for admission to the bar, and the Members of the Maryland State Board of Law Examiners,[5] (Board), who are responsible for the administration and enforcement of said rules and regulations, including Rule 14a(iii).[6]

In general, those desirous of being licensed to practice law in the State of Maryland must sit for the regular bar examination, a twelve-hour examination administered over two successive days twice annually.

> Since July 1972 the Maryland Bar examination [has] consisted of multiple choice questions given on one day and essay questions given on the second day. The multiple choice or Multi-State Bar Examination (MBE) questions are prepared and graded by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) and are administered simultaneously in a majority of the states. The essay questions cover a variety of subjects and are prepared and graded by the Board members and their assistants. The subjects tested are prescribed by the Court of Appeals in Rule 7(d)....[7]

Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D. Md. 1977).

A less comprehensive examination may be taken in lieu of the regular bar examination by individuals who qualify under Rule 14. The "out-of-state attorney examination" lasts three hours and consists "entirely of questions requiring essay answers." Board Rule 3. The subject matter examined upon is limited to the Maryland Rules of Procedure, the Maryland District Rules governing practice and procedure in criminal and civil cases, and the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility.

The three classes of individuals who may sit for the less comprehensive examination are described in subsection

(a) of MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 10, §7 (Supp. 1976) as those "who, for five of the preceding seven years [have] been engaged as a practitioner, judge, or teacher of law. . . ." Rule 14a(iii) implements this subsection and specifies the qualifications required of an applicant by providing

> that for at least five of the seven years immediately preceding the filing of his petition he has been regularly engaged in any of the following activities: as a practitioner of law; as a full-time teacher of law at a law school approved by the American Bar Association; or as a judge of a court of record. If engaged as a practitioner of law, such practice must have been in a jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the applicant was admitted to practice by the highest court of such jurisdiction.[8]

Plaintiff William Jensen is a Maryland resident who has retired from 27 years of service to the United States Government as an attorney, the last eight years as an administrative law judge with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Plaintiff was admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of Nebraska on June 24, 1950 and to the Bar of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on June 29, 1979.

On December 26, 1979, plaintiff timely petitioned the Board for permission to sit for the out-of-state attorney examination, which was due to be administered on February 26, 1980, and alleged as grounds for qualification that he was a "practitioner" as that term is defined in Rule 14d[9] and that he had served as an ALJ from May 1971 to March 1979. The Board's secretary, John E. Boerner, advised plaintiff by letter dated January 16, 1980 that he was ineligible for admission under Rule 14, not because

his competence and reputation did not satisfy the definition of practitioner under Rule 14d, but because he had not been formally admitted to the D. C. bar for five years as mandated by Rule 14a(iii). Nothing was said of plaintiff's eligibility under the 'judge of a court of record' classification.

A week later, plaintiff filed exceptions to the Board's action with the Court of Appeals, alleging error in the Board's *sub silentio* determination of ineligibility as a judge of a court of record and challenging the application of Rule 14a(iii) to his situation. In a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's exceptions without opinion,[10] whereupon plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, alleging a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants initially moved to dismiss on the ground that Rule 14a(iii) is rationally related to the state's interest in regulating admission to the bar.

On June 6, 1980, the Federal Bar Association (FBA) submitted a brief *amicus curiae*[11] urging that Rule 14a(iii) be struck down as violative of the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses, as imposing an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, and arguing in the alternative that it was error not to treat a federal ALJ as a judge of a court of record. Defendants supplemented their original motion to dismiss in order to address the FBA's contentions, and oral argument was heard on September 12, 1980.

In the interim, plaintiff had filed a motion for summary judgment. As the issues raised by both sets of motion papers are identical, the court will treat them as cross motions for summary judgment.

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

As a threshold matter, the court must address a jurisdictional argument raised in defendants' supplemental memorandum in support of their motion. Defendants aver that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review a state court's adjudication of a particular bar application, contending such review is available only by a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. In support of this contention, defendants cite significant Fourth Circuit precedents and decisions in other circuits as well. *Nestler v. Board of Law Examiners of the State of N. Carolina,* 611 F.2d 1380, 1383 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1980); *Woodard v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,* 598 F.2d 1395 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); *see Richardson v. McFadden,* 563 F.2d 1130, 1132-34 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Hall, J., concurring), *cert. denied,* 435 U.S. 968 (1978); *Doe v. Pringle,* 550 F.2d 596, 599 (10th Cir. 1976), *cert, denied,* 431 U.S. 916 (1977); *Feldman v. State Board of Law Examiners,* 438 F.2d 699, 701 (8th Cir. 1971); *MacKay v. Nesbett,* 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 396 U.S. 960 (1969). This array of legal authority would dispose of the case but for the fact that defendants have misconceived the gravamen of the complaint. This is not a claim that the state has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission or has unlawfully disbarred a particular individual; this case presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the state's *rules themselves,* to whomever applied. That a federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain the latter category of lawsuit is well settled. *See Moore v. Supreme Court of S. Carolina,* 447 F. Supp. 527 (D.S.C. 1977), *aff'd mem.,* 577 F.2d 735 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 439 U.S. 984 (1978); *Goldsmith v. Pringle,* 399 F. Supp. 620 (D. Colo. 1975); *Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court,* 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D. Mont.), *aff'd,* 419 U.S. 955 (1974); *Brown v. Supreme Court*

of Virginia, 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va. 1973), *aff'd sub nom. Titus v. Supreme Court of Virginia,* 414 U.S. 1034, *rehearing denied,* 414 U.S. 1138 (1974); *Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of N. Carolina,* 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. N.C. 1970).

EQUAL PROTECTION

Turning first to the equal protection claim, it is by now quite clear (as plaintiff concedes) that neither a "fundamental right" nor a "suspect classification" analysis is appropriate here. *See, e.g., Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, supra,* 372 F. Supp. at 1181-83 (fundamental right to travel unaffected by conferral of diploma privilege on Montana law school graduates). Thus the classification created by Rule 14a(iii) is not to be subjected to "strict scrutiny", and defendants need not demonstrate a "compelling state interest" in the objectives accomplished by the rule. *See e.g., Hawkins v. Moss,* 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied,* 420 U.S. 928 (1975). Therefore, the equal protection analysis must proceed under the so-called "rational basis" test, under which Rule 14a(iii) must be sustained so long as it "rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest." *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,* 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). *See also Parham v. Hughes,* 441 U.S. 347, 351, 357 (1979) (where state law does not invidiously discriminate, legislative classification will be upheld if "rationally related to a permissible state objective.")

It is crucial in this inquiry to delineate precisely what it is that plaintiff is challenging. No one will gainsay that the requirement of five years' experience in practice is rationally related to the state's interest in monitoring the competence of attorneys admitted to practice. *See Shenfield v. Prather,* 387 F. Supp. 676, 688 (N.D. Miss.

1974). Similarly, courts have held there is a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose in rules requiring different treatment in admissions to the bar depending upon the nature or quality of applicants' legal training. *Lombardi v. Tauro*, 470 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1972), *cert. denied*, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); *Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, supra; Goldsmith v. Pringle, supra; see also Bib'le v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the State of California*, 162 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1980) (State may require first year law student at unaccredited law school to pass examination as precondition to eligibility to sit for general bar examination). Plaintiff challenges none of these aspects of the Maryland Rules. Plaintiff *does* question the rationality of the relationship between these concededly legitimate state interests—adequate legal education, competence, fitness to practice law—and a rule which imposes a more burdensome standard on those out-of-state attorneys who, though otherwise qualified under the rule, have practiced outside the jurisdiction in which they have been admitted.

As Mr. Justice Black wrote in his majority opinion in *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico*, 353 U.S. 232 (1957):

> A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, *but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. . . .* Even *in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards.*

Id. at 239 (emphasis added). Insofar as plaintiff's qualifications as a practitioner are concerned, it is undisputed

that he has been a member in good standing of the Nebraska bar for 30 years, that he had 19 years' experience as an attorney for the United States Government prior to his eight-year tenure as an ALJ, and that his record was unblemished enough to satisfy the requirements of the District of Columbia bar, to which he was admitted last year.

An inevitable consequence of Rule 14a(iii) and similar rules in other jurisdictions is to ensure familiarity with those areas of law deemed essential to the competent practice of law and therefore subject to being tested upon in the general bar examination. But is there any rationality in asserting (as Rule 14a(iii) implicitly does) that one who has practiced tax law for thirty years as a private practitioner in the District of Columbia and who is admitted to the District of Columbia bar is any more familiar with Criminal Law, Property, or Torts than an attorney with equivalent experience working for the Internal Revenue Service in Washington but not admitted to the District of Columbia bar? Why is it rational to conclude that one who teaches courses in Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, or the Philosophy of Socialist Law is perforce familiar with the substantive law of Business Associations or Commercial Transactions simply by virtue of being a professor at an accredited law school?

The Constitution demands that rules employed by the state be "substantially related to achievement of . . . [the] objectives" invoked to justify those rules. *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In *Trimble v. Gordon*, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois rule making it impossible for illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from their fathers, on the ground that the classification bore only the "most attenuated relationship to the asserted goal." *Id.* at 768.

Lawyers today tend to specialize, and defendants' justifications for Rule 14a(iii) prove too much: assuring a basic level of competence in the subject areas emphasized leads a reasonable person ineluctably to the conclusion that the general bar examination should be a prerequisite to *all* admissions.

Nor can the requirement of practicing in the jurisdiction of admission be justified on grounds of monitoring the applicants' professional conduct. First, examining an applicant's character was one of the justifications advanced in support of a different Maryland rule, the residency requirement. *See Golden v. State Board of Law Examiners,* 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978). Second, such a justification for Rule 14a(iii) could hardly explain the inclusion of law professors.

Regrettably, not all motivations behind restrictions on admissions of out-of-state attorneys are laudable. One past president of the American Bar Association has noted, "Many of the states that have erected fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their own lawyers from professional competition." Smith, *Time for a National Practice of Law Act,* 64 A.B.A. J. 557, 557 (1978). In discussing the evolution of Rule 14 through the year 1967, William H. Adkins, II, to former Member of the Board, observed:

> The unstated premise against liberal admission on motion is an economic one. It involves the fear of lawyers, especially those in the Washington suburban areas, that they will be immersed in a tidal wave of retired JAG officers, Department of Justice employees, and the like. Standards for admission to the bar should not however, be based on a desire to suppress competition, a sort of protective tariff approach. The only permissible consideration . . . should

> be whether the applicant has sufficient professional experience to give a reasonable assurance of at least that degree of basic legal ability and perceptiveness measurable by a bar examination. . . .

Adkins, *What Doth the Board Require of Thee?* 28 MD. L. REV. 103, 112-113 (1968) (citation omitted). That the history of the rules governing out-of-state admissions to the Maryland bar has been one of slow but progressive liberalization as a result of pressure brought to bear from various sources is well documented in Mr. Adkins' article. *Id.* at 109-13.[12]

From this history, it is clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Board are strangers to the evolution of a fair procedure for admitting out-of-state attorneys. By accretion, such categories as corporate house counsel became eligible for admission without taking the general bar examination. Plaintiff urges that now the time has come for the United States Government attorneys, and finding no rational justification for exclusion, this court agrees.

JUDGE OF A COURT OF RECORD[13]

As noted earlier, plaintiff alleged an independent ground for qualification under Rule 14a(iii), namely, as a "judge of a court of record." While neither the Board nor the Court of Appeals advanced reasons for denying plaintiff's admission under this heading, the legal memoranda filed in support of their motion to dismiss have informed the court of the considerations deemed relevant.

In brief, defendants argue that judges of a court of record are exempt because of a presumption that individuals occupying such positions are necessarily familiar with the principles of law covered by the Maryland Bar

Examination, but that no such presumption attaches to an ALJ, who presides over proceedings only quasi-judicial in nature and encompassing only a limited area of substantive law. Defendants argue in essence that administrative agencies are not "courts of record."

In support of this contention, defendants cite the recent decision in *Attorney General v. Johnson,* 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1977), *appeal dismissed,* 439 U.S. 805 (1978), as well as earlier cases, and urge that this court is "bound to give credence to the interpretation by the Maryland Court of Appeals of a State court rule." Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 10, *citing O'Brien v. Skinner,* 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974).[14] While this court is not "bound" by a *sub silentio* construction inferable from the failure of the Maryland Court of Appeals to address one of the claims advanced by plaintiff, due consideration should be given to the carefully reasoned opinions of that court in previous cases. Such consideration is particularly appropriate as a matter of comity where, as here, the subject of litigation is the state court's regulation of its own Bar.

Defining exactly what constitutes a "court of record" presents a surprisingly novel question. Counsel at oral argument were not able to provide such a definition, although some discussion was had in which individual components of what might in the aggregate be an adequate definition were identified. During that argument, the court had occasion to refer to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425-26 (4th ed. rev. 1968), which offers the following:

> *Courts of record* and *courts not of record.* The former being those whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled, or recorded, for a perpetual memory and testimony, and which have power to fine or imprison for contempt. Error lies to their judgments, and they

> generally possess a seal. Courts not of record are those of inferior dignity, which have no power to fine or imprison, and in which the proceedings are not enrolled or recorded.

Not unexpectedly, the forum in question is a hybrid, based on this definition. Federal administrative adjudications are "on the record" and administrative law judges, though employees of the agency, are required to be independent of the investigation and prosecutorial functions of the agency and its staff. *See* 5 U.S.C. §554(d). Decisions of ALJs are appealable to and reviewable by the agency itself, and judicial review by a federal court must usually await "final agency action." 5 U.S.C. §704. *See generally Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,* 387 U.S. 136 (1967); *N.Y.S.E. v. Bloom,* 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *Kixmuller v. SEC,* 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, ALJs do not have power directly to fine or imprison for contempt and do not possess a seal, though the agency itself does.

In *Attorney General v. Johnson, supra,* the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed a declaratory judgment which had invalidated the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act for "vest[ing] judicial power in an administrative agency contrary to the [separation of powers] mandates of the Maryland Constitution. . . ." 282 Md. at 283. The statute in question required referral of medical malpractice claims to nonbinding arbitration for a preliminary determination of liability and damages before recourse could be had to the state courts. The Court of Appeals observed:

> [T]he mere performance by a nonjudicial body of a function that would in another context be considered purely judicial—*e.g.*, the determination of facts and

> the application of legal principles to those facts—cannot alone suffice to support a conclusion that the separation of powers principle has been violated. Were that not so, of course, no administrative agency performing an adjudicatory function could survive constitutional muster. As we observed in *Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Linchester*, 274 Md. 211, 222, 234 A.2d 514, 522 (1975), while administrative agencies perform activities which are legislative in nature, they are also frequently "called upon to make factual determinations and thus adjudicate"; this dual role has long been accepted as constitutionally permissible. We have pointed out before, and we reemphasize here, that adjudicatory determinations by such agencies are not judgments or decrees, *see Dal Maso v. County Commrs.*, 182 Md. 200, 205, 34 A.2d 464, 466 (1943); that such an agency ascertains questions of fact and applies the law to those facts in a particular case does not alone vest it with judicial power in the constitutional sense.

Id. at 284. Citing decisions from state courts in Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota,[15] the Court of Appeals found "that the essence of judicial power is the final authority to render and enforce a judgment. . . ." *Id.* at 286.

Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 531 (1975) held unconstitutional (under the Maryland Constitution) a statute providing for direct review by the Court of Appeals of judgments of the Maryland Tax Court, on the ground that the latter tribunal was not clothed with the judicial authority prerequisite to the exercise of the former's appellate jurisdiction. The court's analysis quoted from an earlier decision in *Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co.*, 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917):

> What is a judicial function does not depend solely on the mental operation by which it is performed or the importance of the Act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the division of powers of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within the subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs, to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial.

Id. at 282.

To these arguments, amicus FBA retorts that Maryland's distinctions between judicial and administrative adjudications relevant for purposes of exercising appellate jurisdiction or enforcing separation of powers are not relevant to the question whether the qualifications for and the responsibilities of the modern federal administrative law judge are sufficiently different from those of "a judge of a court of record" to justify the discrimination in admission to Maryland's Bar. Plaintiff himself argues that in *Butz v. Economou*, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Supreme Court expressly recognized the functional equivalence of ALJs to other federal judges in holding them entitled to the same judicial immunity.

> We think that adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics

> of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages. The conflicts which federal hearing examiners seek to resolve are every bit as fractious as those which come to court. . . .
>
> There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions. See [5 U.S.C.] §556(c). More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency.

Id. at 512-13.

Although the question is thus not free from doubt, the court is persuaded that the ability to enforce and effectuate judgments and the power to impose contempt sanctions upon recalcitrant parties in order to preserve the integrity of and respect due our court system are necessary elements, absent which a tribunal may not truly be said to be a "court of record" for purposes of Rule 14a(iii). This conclusion is not at odds with *Economou*, as the necessity for absolute immunity in preserving the independence of adjudicating officers (or for that matter of prosecuting officers) is well-established. *See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 422-26 (1976). As the court said of an ALJ in *Economou*, "His powers are often, *if not generally*, comparable to those of a trial judge. . . ." 438 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). In *Atlas Roofing Co. v. Oc-*

cupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). Mr. Justice White's opinion for a unanimous Court (Mr. Justice Blackmun not participating) observed: "In cases which . . . involve only 'private rights,' this Court has accepted fact-finding by an administrative agency only as an adjunct to an art. III court, analogizing the agency to a jury or a special master[16] and permitting it in admiralty cases to perform the function of the special master." *Id.* at 450, n.7 (citation omitted). *See also id.* at 455 & n.13 ("[T]hese cases do not present the question whether Congress may commit the adjudication of public rights and the imposition of fines for their violation to an administrative agency without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.") This court holds, therefore, that there is a rational basis in determining that federal ALJs do *not* qualify for admission to the Maryland Bar under Rule 14a(iii)'s exemption for "judges of a court of record".

In so holding, the court does not agree totally with the position advocated by the Maryland Attorney General, *i.e.*, that a "court of record" for purposes of Rule 14a(iii) is defined by Art. IV §1 of the Maryland Constitution.[17] The logical extension of such an argument would be that federal district and appellate judges are not judges of courts of record for purposes of qualifying for the exemption under Rule 15a(iii), an outcome this court believes, however, immodestly, would be clearly unconstitutional. But even if it be conceded that federal judges of Art. III courts would qualify, the application of the arguments advanced by defendants to a situation involving an Art. I tribunal such as the United States Tax Court would cause grave concern; for, as recognized in *Shell Oil v. Supervisor of Assessments, supra*, "Under the Maryland Constitution, *unlike the Federal Constitution*, the judicial func-

tion may be exercised only by those courts enumerated in the Constitution." 276 Md. at 44 (emphasis added). However, such questions are not before the court and are adverted to only to illuminate the considerations that surround a case such as this.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Although the literal language of the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 3, speaks in terms of power bestowed upon Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States, . . .", it is by now well settled that the Clause limits the authority of a State to erect barriers against interstate commerce. *See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma*, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); *Philadelphia v. New Jersey*, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); *H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond*, 336 U.S. 525. 534-48 (1949). To the extent that matters of "legitimate local concern", *Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice*, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978), permit state regulation, the proper amount of such regulation is a determination often requiring "delicate adjustment." *H. P. Hood, supra*, 336 U.S. at 553 (Black, J. dissenting). But "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually *per se* rule of invalidity has been erected." *Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra*, 437 U.S. at 624. *See also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977); *Pike v. Bruce Church*, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Similarly, where a differential impact on interstate and local commerce is demonstrated, as it has been in this case, the state regulation is presumptively invalid as a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. *Hunt, supra*, 432 U.S. at 349-50; *Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison*, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.1 (1951).

To rebut this presumption of invalidity, defendants point to the State's interest in assuring that members

of the legal profession are well qualified before they may be admitted to the Maryland Bar. Concededly, regulation of the practice of law is a matter of "legitimate local concern". *E.g., Schware v. Board of Examiners of New Mexico,* 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Maryland's interest is said to be particularly strong in this area, where the licensing standards at issue relate to *professional* competence; and the question arises in this case whether the ancient common law distinction between "learned professions" and "common" occupations or trades is of Constitutional moment. At one time in our history, law, along with medicine and theology, were the only "professions", *see* Gellhorn, *The Abuse of Occupational Licensing,* 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 10-14 (1976), and were distinguished by no less a scholar than Mr. Justice Story from "trades". *The Schooner Nymph,* 18 Fed. Cas. 506, 507 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834). However, recent decisions have cast doubt on the continuing vitality of such a distinction.

In *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,* 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court held that minimum fee schedules required by the Virginia State Bar Association were a "restraint of *trade*" in violation of the Sherman Act. Explicit in that decision was the Court's recognition, "In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce." *Id.* at 788. Similarly, in *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,* 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court held unconstitutional a ban on advertising by two attorneys operating as a "clinic" offering routine legal services inexpensively to middle-income individuals ineligible for government aid. Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court concluded that the argument that the practice of law was somehow "above" trade was "an anachronism." *Id.* at 371-72.

Given, then, that the practice of law is commerce, (and more particularly "interstate commerce", *see Goldfarb, supra*), that Rule 14a(iii) imposes a differential impact upon the admission to the practice of law, that this impact inures to the benefit primarily of local practitioners, and that (as discussed earlier) the rule as promulgated is not rationally related to the objective, this court holds that Rule 14a(iii) is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.

THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court have begun to flesh out the meaning of the long-neglected[18] Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art IV, §2 of the Constitution. In *Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n*, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), the Court upheld the validity of Montana's statutory elk-hunting license scheme[19] against challenges brought under both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion resuscitated an 1825 decision authored by Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington, *Corfield v. Coryell*, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825), which held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only certain "fundamental rights", which included:

> The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, *professional pursuits*, or otherwise. . . .

Id. at 552[20] (emphasis added).

Also quoted was the opinion of Mr. Justice Field in *Paul v. Virginia*, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869):

> It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State upon the

> same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.

The Court in *Baldwin* held that elk hunting was merely a means of recreation and not a fundamental right, and was therefore *not* one of those "basic and essential activities, interference with which would frustate the purposes of the formation of the Union. . . ." *Baldwin, supra,* 436 U.S. at 387. The import of this decision is that the Privileges and Immunities Clause comes into play only where equal treatment of residents and nonresidents impacts upon a fundamental right and is directly related to furthering the interests of comity and "fashioning a single nation." *Austin v. New Hampshire,* 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975).

Later in the same term as the *Baldwin* decision, the Court handed down *Hicklin v. Orbeck,* 437 U.S. 518 (1978). Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for a unanimous Court held unconstitutional the "Alaska Hire" statute, which gave Alaska residents an absolute preference for employment opportunities related, however remotely, to the state's oil and gas industry. The opinion relied on prior cases "holding violative of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause

state discrimination against nonresidents seeking to ply their trade, practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling within the State." *Id.* at 524. Thus, in *Ward v. Maryland,* 12 Wall. 418 (1871), the Court had struck down a Maryland statute

> requiring nonresident merchants to obtain licenses in order to practice their trade without requiring the same of certain similarly situated Maryland merchants; it charged nonresidents a higher license fee than those Maryland residents who were required to secure licenses; and it prohibited both resident and nonresident merchants from using nonresident salesmen, other than their regular employees, to sell their goods in the city. . . . *Ward* thus recognized that a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel to another State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the other State.

Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra, 437 U.S. at 525. Justice Brennan went on to point out, however, that this view was modified by *Toomer v. Witsell,* 334 U.S. 385 (1948), which explained that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it," *id.* at 396, provided such reasons are "substantial", *i.e.,* provided that "there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the [discriminatory] statute is aimed."[21] *Id.* at 398. The *Hicklin* Court went on to hold that the "peculiar source of evil" identified by the Alaska legislature—i.e., a serious underemployment problem, particularly among Eskimos, Aleuts, and others in geographically remote areas—bore no substantial relationship to a statute discriminating against nonresidents.

To summarize the principles of law articulated by the *Baldwin* and *Hicklin* decisions, a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is made out when state action

1. imposes upon residents and nonresidents unequal treatment

2. which directly impacts upon the interests of comity and federalism

3. where a fundamental right is involved

4. and where the discrimination does not bear a substantial relationship to the "pecular evil" at which the state action is aimed.

Proceeding under this four-step analysis, it is clear from the earlier part of this opinion that Rule 14a(iii) results in unequal treatment, but the inequality is not between residents and nonresidents but among various categories of nonresidents. In this connection, defendants cite the decision in *Hawkins v. Moss,* 503 F.d2 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), in which Judge Russell said of the Privileges and Immunities Clause:

> The basic thrust of that section is to prevent "a state from discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of its own", *Hague v. C.I.O.,* 307 U.S. 496 (1939). So long, then, as the State does not subject the migrant attorney, seeking the right to practice in the State, to no more [*sic*] onerous requirements than those imposed on its own citizens seeking such right, it cannot be said that the State has violated the section.

Id. at 1179-80 (footnote omitted).

Defendants argue further that in a recent decision in this district, Judge Frank A. Kaufman relied on *Hawkins* in

rejecting a challenge, premised on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, to the Maryland residency requirements for bar admission. *Golden v. State Board of Law Examiners,* 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978), *vacated and appeal dismissed,* 614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980).

Insofar as the judgment in *Golden* was vacated both because the case was moot and because the plaintiff therein lacked standing to raise the claim, that case is without any precedential value.[22] *Hawkins,* a decision of the Fourth Circuit, is more troublesome precedent, but this court has concluded that the Supreme Court's decision three years after *Hawkins* in *Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n,* 429 U.S. 318 (1977) renders questionable the former case's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. True, *Boston Stock Exchange* was decided under the Commerce Clause and not the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but in view of the "mutually reinforcing relationship" between the two clauses.[23] *Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra,* 437 U.S. at 531-32; *see Baldwin, supra,* 436 U.S. at 379-80, the guidance provided by Commerce Clause cases is applicable to the analysis of Privileges and Immunities questions.

Boston Stock Exchange concerned an amendment to a New York statute imposing a transfer tax on securities transactions such that out-of-state sales (by whomever made) were taxed more heavily than sales made *by nonresidents* within the state. The purpose of this statute, as amended, was to encourage nonresidents of New York to conduct sales transactions within the state and to provide relief from the competitive disadvantage thought to exist by virtue of the levying of any transfer tax at all by New York exchanges, as against out-of-state exchanges. The State Tax Commission sought to defend this statutory scheme by arguing that as only nonresidents were eligible

for the reduced rate of tax, no discrimination favoring residents over nonresidents could be said to exist. In striking down the statute, Mr. Justice White's opinion for a unanimous Court stated in part:

> There has been no prior occasion expressly to address the question whether a State may tax in a manner that discriminates between two types of interstate transactions in order to favor local commercial interests over out-of-state businesses, but the clear import of our Commerce Clause cases is that such discrimination is constitutionally impermissible.

429 U.S. at 335. *See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.*, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970); *Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.*, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) *Guy v. Baltimore*, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880).

This court thus considers as satisfied the first of the four elements outlined above. Although Rule 14a(iii) on its face discriminates only among various categories of nonresidents, the manifest effect of the rule is to favor the interests of Maryland residents who are members of the Maryland Bar, just as the New York statute in *Boston Stock Exchange* effectively favored the interests of members of the New York stock exchanges.

The second of the four elements is also satisfied on this record. The clash of the state's interest in regulating standards of admission to practice before its courts with the federal interest in protecting a citizen's right to pursue a legitimate occupation and earn a livelihood, *Toomer v. Witsell*, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948), certainly calls into play serious considerations of comity and federalism. Again, the question is not whether the state can regulate the legal profession at all but whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes a limitation which this particular form of regulation has exceeded.

The third element raises the question in this case of whether the practice of law is, like the pursuit of other occupations, a fundamental right. This court has already had occasion to comment on the demise of the common law distinction between "learned professions" and "trades". *See* p. 14, *supra*. Reference has also been made to the two recent Supreme Court decisions which have helped define the contours of the Privileges and Immunities Clause; thus it has been determined that elk hunting is not a fundamental right, *Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n*, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), but that pursuing a livelihood in Alaska's oil and gas industry is. *Hicklin v. Orbeck*, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). It requires no feat of judicial legerdemain to hold that the practice of law falls within the latter category rather than the former.

Finally, the fourth element has been decided in the context of the disposition of the earlier claims. Rule 14a (iii) bears no substantial relationship to the "peculiar evil" at which it is aimed because practice in a state other than the state of admission does not preclude competence or familiarity with the subject areas tested by the full bar examination.

This analysis compels the conclusion that Rule 14a(iii) also violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV §2.

Having concluded this discussion of the issues raised in the case, the court wishes to add one observation. Federal judges generally are keenly aware of the need to set high standards of admission to the practice of law before the courts. This court is also aware of the difficulties inherent in fashioning rules of general application to achieve these laudatory goals. Plaintiffs will indeed have won a Pyrrhic victory if, as a result of this decision, the expedited admission process is abrogated and Maryland

becomes an "examination only" jurisdiction, and this is especially true as Rule 14a is far from being permeated with the vice of unconstitutionality. Therefore, it is hoped, with sincerity, that the rule itself will not be jettisoned, but rather that as a consequence of the result here reached the rule can be so revised as to cure the constitutional defect, thus effecting the "delicate adjustment" Mr. Justice Black spoke of long ago. *H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond*, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949) (Black, J. dissenting).

For the foregoing reasons, it is this 13th day of November 1980, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Rule 14a(iii) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is unconstitutional.

/s/ HERBERT F. MURRAY
United States District Judge

FOOTNOTES

1. Rule 14a regulates admission to the Maryland Bar and provides: Out-of-State Attorneys

a. Petition - Contents.

If any member of the Bar of another State, District or Territory of the United States including Puerto Rico applies for admission to the Bar of this State pursuant to section 7 of Article 10 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1968 Replacement Volume), he shall file with the Board a petition, under oath, addressed to the Court of Appeals, in which he shall state

(i) that he intends to practice law in this State or that he intends to teach law full-time at a law school approved by the American Bar Association, naming the law school;

(ii) each jurisdiction in which, and each Court by which the petitioner was admitted to the Bar; and whether by examination, diploma privilege or on motion;

(iii) that for at least five of the seven years immediately preceding the filing of his petition he has been regularly engaged in any of the following activities: as a practitioner of law; as a full-time teacher of law at a law school approved by the American Bar Association; or as a judge of a court of record. If engaged as a practitioner of law, such practice must have been in a jurisdiction or jurisdiction in which the applicant was admitted to practice by the highest court of such jurisdiction.

The rule in controversy was originally promulgated as Rule 14a(iv) but was redesignated 14a(iii) as part of an October 14, 1979 amendment which deleted former Rule 14a(i).

2. Hereinafter cited by rule number.

3. Robert C. Murphy, Chief Judge, and Judges Marvin H. Smith, J. Dudley Digges, John C. Eldridge, Harry A. Cole, Rita C. Davidson, and Lawrence F. Rodowsky.

4. Md. Ann. Code Article 10, §7(a) (Supp. 1976):

Admission after five years' practice elsewhere.

(a) After becoming an actual resident of the State of Maryland, a member of the bar of any state, district or territory of the United States, who, for five of the preceding seven years, has been engaged as a practitioner, judge or teacher of law, shall be admitted to the bar of this State after having satisfactorily passed an examination given by the State Board of Law Examiners. In addition, as a prerequisite to admission to the bar, each applicant shall provide proof of good moral character. The Court of Appeals may make rules for the content and administration of the examination, the determination of the applicants' character and any other rules necessary to provide for the admission to

the bar of persons making application for admission on the basis of this subsection.

5. Jerrold V. Powers (Chairman), Charles H. Dorsey, Jr., William H. Price, II, William F. Abell, Jr., David G. Daneker, Diane G. Schulte, and J. Frederick Sharer.

6. Pursuant to the authority granted by Rule 7h, the Board has adopted its own rules [hereinafter cited by number as Board Rule] governing the subject matter and passing requirements of the various examinations described, *infra*.

7. Rule 7d provides:

Subject Matter

The Board shall by rule define the subject matter of the examination which shall be within but need not include all of the following areas:

Agency
Business Associations
Commercial Transactions
Constitutional Law
Contracts
Criminal Law and Procedure
Evidence
Maryland Civil Procedure
Property
Torts

Single questions or problems may encompass more than one subject-area. Subject labels on the examination shall not be necessary.

8. Rule 14a(iii) was amended to its present form by the Court of Appeals as an "emergency" measure on April 7, 1978, 5 Md. Reg. 584 (1978) and was made effective April 10, 1978. Its predecessor more closely tracked the language of the statute and provided

> that[the applicant] has for at least five years before filing his petition been regularly engaged as a practitioner or teacher of the law or a judge or any combination thereof; and that the five years during which he was so engaged was performed within seven years prior to the filing of his petition.

9. Rule 14d provides:

> d. Practitioner—Requirements
>
> For purposes of this Rule a practitioner of the law is defined as a member of the Bar of another State, District or Territory of the United States including Puerto Rico who throughout the period specified in the petition has regularly engaged in the practice of law in such jurisdiction as the principal means of earning his livelihood and whose entire professional experience and responsibilities have been sufficient to satisfy the Board that the petitioner should be admitted under this Rule. The Board may consider, among other things,

(i) the extent of the petitioner's experience in general practice;

(ii) if the petitioner is or has been a specialist, the extent of his experience and reputation for competence in such specialty;

(iii) if the petitioner is or has been an employee of a law firm, government or a corporation or other employer, the nature and extent of his professional duties and responsibilities as such employee, the extent of his contacts with and responsibility to clients or other beneficiaries of his professional skills, the extent of his professional contacts with practicing lawyers and judges and of his professional reputation among them and

(iv) any professional articles or treaties of which the petitioner has been the author.

10. The summary order of February 8, 1980, signed by Chief Judge Murphy, did indicate that dissenting judges Eldridge, Cole and Davidson considered Rule 14a(iii) arbitrary and would have sustained plaintiff's exceptions.

11. On May 23, 1980, the Federal Bar Association sought the court's permission to submit a brief *amicus curiae*, and the court having received a letter from defense counsel indicating that such a submission would be welcome, and sensible that this case would affect the efforts of government attorneys who apply for admission to the Maryland bar, granted its permission on June 2.

12. Among other things, the business community in Maryland was seriously concerned about the admission of house counsel. There were also those who felt that the definition of practitioner of the law contained in Rule Fourteenth was arbitrary. These people argued that the purpose of a rule pertaining to admissions on motion was to insure that the applicant had a background in practice indicating the sort of general familiarity with law that would be demonstrated by passing a written examination. They submitted that house counsel and government lawyers of broad experience could not reasonably be excluded merely because they had not been engaged in private practice, a practice which might, in fact, have been specialized and narrow. The matter came to a head when the petition of Robert B. Seeley, a member of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company's law department, was rejected by a two-to-one Board decision. All members of the Board agreed that Mr. Seeley was qualified for admission on the basis of character and general experience. The Board majority recommended against his admission solely because he was the employee of a corporation and thus did not "maintain a[n] . . . office for the general practice of law" as required by the rule. Mr. Seeley appealed to the court of appeals. Before the case was argued, Rule Fourteenth was amended (in 1965) to permit his admission.

. . .

Adkins, *What Doth the Board Require of Thee?* 28 MD. L. REV. 103, 110 (1968).

13. In view of the disposition of the equal protection claim as applied to United States Government attorneys, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to decide the remaining issues in the case. However, given the growing importance of these issues as the federal agencies and their professional employees proliferate, the court deems fuller consideration appropriate.

14. *O'Brien* is not authority for quite so broad a proposition. That case was an appeal from the Court of Appeals of New York's interpretation of New York election statutes to permit the State to decline to provide incarcerated individuals with a mobile voting registration procedure. The trial and intermediate appellate courts had deemed confinement a physical disability (within the meaning of the New York statutes) entitling the prisoners to vote by absentee ballot, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed that determination. The Supreme Court held that the New York high court's construction of the election statutes denied equal protection of the laws and must be reversed. In so doing, the Court noted the conflict between the lower court's construction of the statute and that of the Court of Appeals, but Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion properly observed that "it is not our function to construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State." *Id.* at 531.

15. *Cedar Rapids, Etc. v. Cedar Rapids Community Schools*, 222 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Iowa 1974); *Underwood v. McDuffee*, 15 Mich. 361, 368 (1867); *Breimhorst v. Beckman*, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719, 733 (1949).

16. Notably, Maryland's view is consistent with Justice White's observation in that Masters are not vested with any part of the judicial power of the state. *In re Anderson*, 272 Md. 85, 321 A. 2d 516 (1974), *cert. denied*, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).

17. MD. CONST. art IV, §1 provides:

> The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Court of Appeals, and such intermediate courts of appeal, as shall be provided by law by the General Assembly, Circuit Courts, Orphans' Courts, such Courts for the City of Baltimore, as are hereinafter provided for, and a District Court; *all said Courts shall be Courts of Record*, and each shall have a seal to be used in the authentication of all process issuing therefrom. (Emphasis added).

18. Perhaps because of the imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment upon our constitutional consciousness and the extraordinary emphasis that the Amendment has received, it is not surprising that the contours of Art. IV, §2, cl. 1, are not well developed, and that the relationship, if any, between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the "privileges or immunities" language of the Fourteenth Amendment is less than clear.

Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978).

19. Montana imposed substantively higher hunting license fees on nonresidents than on residents and required nonresidents

(but not residents) to purchase a combination license for obtaining, *e.g.*, in 1976, one elk, one deer, one black bear, game birds, and fish caught with hook and line, all for $225.00; residents had the option of procuring a license for elk alone, at a cost of $9.00, or to obtain the same combination for only $30.00. *Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n*, supra at 373-74.

20. Justice Blackmun's opinion in *Baldwin* noted that Justice Washington "seemingly relied on notions of 'natural rights' when he considered the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause," but that the latter had also employed the term 'fundamental' "in the modern as well as the 'natural right' sense." 436 U.S. at 387.

21. Thus, for example, voting, though a fundamental right under equal protection jurisprudence, *Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15*, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969), is not to be regarded as such under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, for the simple reason that a state may limit the right to vote for state officials to those actually residing in the state.

22. In that the reasoning of the District Court's opinion in *Golden* might be thought to provide some guidance, notwithstanding the disposition on appeal, this court notes that the section of the opinion dealing with the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause consists of a direct quotation of the passage from *Hawkins v. Moss* set out in the body of this opinion, *supra*, as well as a quotation from the decision in *Ricci v. State Bd. of Law Examiners*, 427 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The latter starts from the proposition that "[t]he right of an individual to practice law in a state court is not a privilege conferred . . . by the United States Constitution or federal statute" and goes on to assert that a state may condition the right to practice law upon establishing certain "professional and moral qualifications as proscribed [sic] by the state." *Id.* at 617. The second of these two propositions is self-evident and is not at issue in the case at bar: plaintiff does not question the State of Maryland's authority to prescribe particular qualifications as requisites to admission; indeed, plaintiff concedes that the state could decline to provide *any* abbreviated examination or other vehicle for expedited admission and instead require all candidates to sit for the full exam. The first proposition is more troublesome and will be dealt with at greater length, *infra*, in the section discussing Privileges and Immunities; suffice it to say for the present that even if the right to practice law is not a privilege granted by the *federal* constitution, it *is* a privilege granted by *state* law, including Rule 14a(iii), and is therefore subject to the usual restrictions on discrimination contained in other parts of the federal constitution, *e.g.* the equal protection clause.

23. The two clauses, though appearing in different articles of the Constitution, *i.e.* art. I, §8 and art. IV, §2, share a common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation and were intended by the Framers to serve the same purposes. *See* Note, *A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV*, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461, 1470-71 (1979).

APPENDIX V

Order of Dismissal of the United States District Court of Maryland in William Jensen v. Robert C. Murphy, et al.

(Filed April 23, 1981)

Civil No. HM80-608

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

WILLIAM JENSEN,

v.

ROBERT C. MURPHY, *etc., et al.*

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, formerly a federal administrative law judge, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Rule 14a(iii) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Defendants are the Judges of the Court of Appeals, which pursuant to Maryland statute promulgates rules and regulations for admission to the bar, and the members of the Maryland State Board of Law Examiners, who are responsible for the administration and enforcement of said rules and regulations, including Rule 14a(iii).

Rule 14a(iii) sets forth the requirements for an attorney who has been practicing law for five out of the last seven years in a state other than Maryland to qualify for the out-of-state attorney's examination for admission to the Maryland Bar. Prior to issuance of the amendment

to Rule 14a(iii) discussed below, the rule provided that such candidates for expedited admission must have been practicing in a state in which they had been admitted by the highest court of the state.

In his complaint, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of this requirement of practice in the jurisdiction of admission. On November 13, 1980, this court issued an order granting plaintiff the declaratory relief requested and enjoining enforcement of Rule 14a(iii) with respect to the requirement of practice in the jurisdiction of admission. Some weeks later, upon the agreement of all litigants in this action, including the Federal Bar Association in its capacity as *amicus curiae*, the court withdrew its opinion in view of impending amendment of Rule 14a(iii).

On December 19, 1980, the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued an order amending Rule 14a(iii) to delete the challenged language. A copy of the revised Rule 14a(iii) is attached and is incorporated by reference in this order. Based on consideration of this action, which deleted the restriction on the definition of "practitioner of law" hereinbefore described, and in light of the oral representations made by the Assistant Attorney General of Maryland that the Court of Appeals has no present intention of discontinuing the out-of-state attorney examination, and in the interests of comity, it is this 23 day of April, 1981, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,

ORDERED that the above-captioned case be, and the same hereby is, *Dismissed* as moot.

/s/ HERBERT F. MURRAY
United States District Judge

APPENDIX VI

Opinion and Order of the United States District Court of Michigan in Bruce Stein v. Mary S. Coleman et al.

(Filed March 12, 1982)

File No. K80-445 CA4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRUCE STEIN,
Plaintiff,

v.

MARY S. COLEMAN, Chief Justice, of the Michigan Supreme Court, *et al.*,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought to challenge the constitutionality of a rule governing admission to the practice of law in Michigan. Plaintiff, a patent lawyer, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the members of the Board of Law Examiners and the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. The Court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on January 25, 1982, and presently has before it the defendants' motion for relief from judgment and to vacate judgment.

Rule 5(A)(6)(a) of the Rules for the Board of Law Examiners provides that an applicant for admission to the bar without examination must have actively practiced law for three of the five years preceding the application.

Defendants interpreted and applied this rule in such a way that patent lawyers whose practice of patent law took place outside Michigan satisfied the rule, but patent lawyers whose practice of patent law occurred within the state did not. This Court held defendants' application of the rule to be a denial of equal protection.

Defendants suggest that the judgment should now be vacated because the relief sought by plaintiff has been granted. It appears that plaintiff has now been admitted to the State Bar of Michigan, and that a review of Rule 5(A)(6)(a) is to be undertaken by defendants for the purpose of considering amendment. Defendants have represented to the Court that until an amendment takes place, patent practitioners who are admitted to the highest court of a state but whose patent practice for three of the five years preceding the application for admission without examination takes place in Michigan, will be admitted without examination, provided all other requisite qualifications are met. Defendants have further represented that any amendment of the rule will not retroactively affect plaintiff and other similarly-situated patent practitioners who are admitted without examination prior to the amendment. Finally, it appears that plaintiff is not opposed to defendants' motion.

In view of these circumstances, and in the interests of comity, the Court is of the opinion that defendants' motion should be granted. This Court's Summary Judgment of January 25, 1982, is hereby vacated, and the accompanying Opinion is withdrawn and this case is hereby dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ BENJAMIN F. GIBSON
U. S. District Judge

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FILED
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No. 84-298

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, II,
Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, and
CHIEF JUSTICE FRANK CELEBREZZE,
JUSTICE CLIFFORD BROWN,
JUSTICE WILLIAM BROWN,
JUSTICE ROBERT HOLMES,
JUSTICE JAMES CELEBREZZE,
JUSTICE RALPH LOCHER,
JUSTICE A. WILLIAM SWEENEY,
Respondents.

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE COUNSEL ASSOCIATION and the FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED	ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE	1
JURISDICTION	3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	3
ARGUMENT	5
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT UPHOLDS A RULE WHICH RESTRICTS THE PRACTICE OF LAW BUT WHICH DOES NOT RELATE TO APPLICANT'S COMPETENCY OR FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW	5
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT PERPETUATES UNJUSTIFIABLE DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF A CLASS OF ATTORNEYS	10
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT IMPAIRS THE EFFICIENT DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO CORPORATIONS THAT USE INSIDE COUNSEL AND TO THE GOVERNMENT	12
CONCLUSION	14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases:	Page
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)	13
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)	11
Jensen v. Murphy, Civ. No. HM 80-608 (U.S.D.C. Md. 1980), Extracts 49 L.W. 2338	9
Salibra v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 730 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1984)	3
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)	5
Stein v. Coleman, 214 U.S.P.Q. 118 (W.D. Mich. 1982)	8
Constitution and Rules:	
Supreme Court Rules of the Government of the Bar of Ohio	*passim*
United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1	9
Other Authorities:	
Horack, *"Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions*, 28 J. Am. Judic. Soc. 102 (1944)	13
Smith, *Time for a National Practice of Law Act*, 64 A.B.A. Journal 557 (1978)	13

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BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE COUNSEL ASSOCIATION and the FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Amicus Curiae, American Corporate Counsel Association and Federal Bar Association, support the petitioner Lawrence A. Salibra II, and respectfully request this Court to issue the Writ of Certiorari.

INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*

This joint brief is submitted on behalf of the American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) and the Federal Bar Association (FBA).

ACCA is a nonprofit co poration chartered in the District of Columbia. ACCA was established in 1982 and has approximately 5,000 members. ACCA has extensive membership in all fifty states and several countries. The purpose of ACCA is to promote and improve the business and professional interests of attorneys who practice law on behalf of organizations in the private sector and who do not hold themselves out to the public for the practice of law. The Board of Directors of ACCA, by resolution, has directed the organization to work to obtain rules and procedures concerning admission to practice which aid corporate counsels' ability to manage their client's legal affairs consistent with each state's interest in maintaining high standards of competence.

FBA is a voluntary professional organization which has served the federal legal profession for over 60 years. The FBA is comprised of nearly 15,000 members and includes lawyers who are or have been in the employ of the federal government, members of the federal judiciary, and other lawyers with a substantial interest in federal law. Approximately 55% of the members are employed as civilian attorneys or administrative law judges by the federal government or are attorneys serving as members of the armed forces of the United States. The remaining members are attorneys who have professional interests related to the government. Since the federal legal community, civilian and military, totals approximately 20,000, those who are members of the FBA comprise a significant portion of that community.

The FBA's mission, as defined in its Constitution, is "to advance the science of jurisprudence," and its first stated objective is "to serve as the national representative of the federal legal profession." The FBA has an interest, therefore, in the resolution with certitude of substantial constitutional issues affecting the status of its members.

Lawyers practicing as members of corporate law departments or with the federal government make up a substantial portion of the bar. Many corporations are expanding the role of their corporate law departments, and the type of legal work performed by ACCA members is little different than that performed by attorneys in law firms. Similarly, attorneys who are employed as "in-house" lawyers for the federal government perform a full range of legal services for their governmental clients.

Both organizations maintain close contact with state bars on questions of admission eligibility and have followed closely the requirements of "practice" such as are involved in the instant case. Both ACCA and FBA contend that the Ohio rules governing admission to practice disadvantage attorneys in the public and corporate sectors. Therefore, a correct decision in the instant case is critically important to the attorneys who comprise both associations.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional grounds are fully set forth in the Petition for Certiorari and need not be set forth here again in accordance with Rule 36.5 of this Court. The decision below of the Sixth Circuit affirming the district court is reported at 730 F.2d 1059.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should issue a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision below because that decision discriminates against a large class of attorneys in a manner which cannot be constitutionally defended. The decision below should also be reviewed because it affects the efficient delivery of legal services to the government and to corporations that use inside counsel.

Although states clearly have authority to regulate admission to the bar within their boundaries, that right is not unfettered. In order to pass constitutional examina-

tion, restrictions on eligibility to practice must be rationally related to an applicant's fitness and capacity to practice law.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has found in this case that the rule furthers the state interest in ensuring a competent bar by (1) encouraging attorneys with less than five years of practice to take the bar immediately and (2) encouraging experienced attorneys to practice within the State of Ohio. To the contrary, however, the rule has neither of these effects. Instead, it operates to impede the ability of corporate and government attorneys, whose fitness or competency are not questioned, to become members of the Ohio bar.

Federal attorneys have a national practice of law which takes them into many state and federal jurisdictions across the country. Similarly, corporations are, with increasing frequency, handling much of their legal work through attorneys who are employees of the corporation. Because the nature and scope of this practice is national, local requirements, such as Ohio's, that do not directly relate to attorney fitness or competence, impair the ability of the government and corporations to have legal services provided in a cost-effective fashion. Rules such as Ohio's place a costly burden on the government and corporations which already employ qualified counsel.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT UPHOLDS A RULE WHICH RESTRICTS THE PRACTICE OF LAW BUT WHICH DOES NOT RELATE TO AN APPLICANT'S COMPETENCY OR FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW.

It is well established that professional licensing procedures of a state will be deemed constitutional only if those procedures are rationally related to a valid state objective. As Mr. Justice Black, in defining that valid state objective, wrote in his majority opinion in *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners*, 353 U.S. 232 (1957):

> A state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character, efficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. *Id.* at 239.

In the instant case, the state has imposed requirements that, when applied to government or corporate counsel, are neither reasonable nor rationally related to a valid state objective. The irrationality of the Ohio Rule is best demonstrated by examining the rule and the decision below.

Rule I, Section 9(A)(e) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, requires that an applicant for admission to the bar without examination show evidence that he or she, while a nonresident, has engaged in legal work as a member of a state bar outside the State of Ohio for at least five years. Attorneys may practice law in the State of Ohio without being members of the Ohio Bar if they register with the Ohio Supreme Court under Rule VI of that court. Rule VI requires a certification of registration by attorneys who practice exclusively for a specific employer. The certificate of registration does not limit the type of work that might be

done by such attorneys but merely limits the attorney to representing the identified employer.

Petitioner passed the Wisconsin bar examination in 1972, is a member of the Wisconsin, Illinois, and New York bars, and has practiced law in Ohio since 1976 by maintaining his certification with the State Supreme Court. His practice has been exclusively for his corporate employer and has taken him into many state and federal courts across the country.

Under the Ohio Rule, then, petitioner is ineligible for admission to the bar without examination solely because he lives in Ohio. This is true even though much of the legal work he has performed has not been conducted within the State of Ohio. The impact of a rule which refuses to credit legal work performed while a resident of Ohio is felt primarily by corporate and federal attorneys who happen to reside in the State of Ohio but who have multistate legal responsibilities for a single employer.

An examination of the decision below does not show how the Ohio bar rules advance a legitimate state interest. The court merely asserts that there is a rational basis for the Ohio Supreme Court's distinction between legal work performed by Ohio residents and nonresidents. Beyond making these assertions, however, the court does not attempt to explain why the choice of residence or place of employment has any impact on fitness or competency.

Certainly the distinction between practice inside and outside the State of Ohio cannot be justified on the basis of guaranteeing attorney competency or fitness. The petitioner has registered with the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to Rule VI. The Ohio Supreme Court has full authority to discipline him should the necessity arise. Moreover, the certification of registration does not limit in any way the type of work that may be performed under

the certification process. Instead, it merely addresses the question of for whom the legal services may be performed.

The purpose of the bar examination is to judge competency. The State of Ohio has made the decision that an attorney practicing *outside* the state borders for a five-year period is presumed competent to practice in Ohio without examination. Likewise, the state has determined that an attorney who has resided *inside* the State of Ohio and practiced under the special certification procedures, cannot be presumed competent and, therefore, must sit for an examination. No attempt is made by the state to assert that the kind of legal work performed by corporate or government attorneys registered with the Ohio Supreme Court under Rule VI is any different from or is of less quality than that performed by other lawyers wishing to obtain admission in the state bar on motion.

Since the state does not articulate differences which relate to competency between the legal skills of attorneys who practice in-state under the certification procedures, and attorneys who practice outside Ohio, the same admission standards should apply to both groups of attorneys. It is constitutionally necessary that both be treated in like fashion. Either both should be required to take the bar examination or both should be allowed credit for legal work performed, regardless of where that work is performed.

The irrationality of the Ohio Rule is highlighted by the fact that it does *not* require that the five years of legal work must be done in the state in which the applicant is admitted. The Ohio Rule only requires that the work not be done while a resident of the state. In other words, had the petitioner gone to work for a corporation outside Ohio, even though in a state in which he was not admitted to the bar, he could now be admitted in Ohio

without examination. This result is patently absurd and does nothing to further the state interest in guaranteeing a competent bar.*

A case directly on point is *Stein v. Coleman*, 214 U.S.P.Q. 118 (W.D. Mich. 1982). That case dealt with admission requirements in the State of Michigan. The court concluded that the equal protection requirements of the Constitution were offended by the state rule which accorded patent attorneys in the state different treatment from those outside the state when computing experience for purposes of admission without examination. According to the opinion, "this court is unable to conclude that Michigan's grant of the privilege of bar admission to attorneys who practice patent law outside the state, while denying the privilege to its own similarly situated citizens who practice within the state, is rationally related to any legitimate state purpose." *Id.* at 121.

The *Stein* court also recognized that corporate practitioners often have a national practice involving federal rather than state law questions. This is equally true for federal attorneys who often deal exclusively in federal courts with federal law and not state law. The court, in rejecting Michigan's limitation on admission as being a denial of equal protection, said (*Id.* at 120):

> The practice of patent law involves the drafting of applications, evaluating of inventions, presenting of patents, filing of amendments and appeals and arguments, in support thereof, *applying the same laws and procedures in each state of the Union.* (Emphasis supplied.)

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* This discussion addresses the inherent incongruity of Ohio's rules for admission on motion. ACCA and FBA do not support the requirements of any state which would make admission on motion turn on prior experience *only* in the state in which the applicant was previously admitted to practice, a requirement not at issue in this case.

Many corporate and government attorneys have national practices, which take them into numerous state and federal courts. As the *Stein* court recognized, and as this Court should also, a rule which does not credit much of this practice cannot be countenanced. (The *Stein* opinion was withdrawn after Michigan agreed to amend its admission rules.)

Another case of interest is *Jensen v. Murphy*, Civ. No. HM 80-608 (U.S.D.C. Md. 1980), Extracts 49 L.W. 2338. Although the *Jensen* opinion was also withdrawn after Maryland amended its rules, it is instructive because the court found the Maryland rule in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges & Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Supreme Court. The Court also articulated a four step analysis by which to gauge whether a state action is constitutionally supportable. Under the *Jensen* analysis, a violation of the Privileges & Immunities Clause (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution) exists when state action:

1. imposes upon residents and nonresidents unequal treatment
2. which directly impacts upon the interests of comity and federalism
3. where a fundamental right is involved
4. and where the discrimination does not bear a substantial relationship to the 'pecular evil' (sic) at which the state action is aimed.

Concerning the first step, a nonresident lawyer having five years of qualified legal work could be admitted to the Ohio bar without examination. Petitioner, a resident of Ohio, with at least five years of qualified legal work must take the Ohio bar examination. It is evident that the Ohio Rule imposes unequal treatment on the petitioner when compared to a nonresident attorney.

The *Jensen* court, discussing the second and third steps, correctly determined that the "practice of law" is a fundamental right which impacts the interests of comity and federalism.

The fourth step, regarding the "peculiar evil" aimed at by the Ohio Rule, is to assure that lawyers licensed to practice law in Ohio are competent, and, as found by the trial court in *Salibra*, to encourage lawyers residing in the State of Ohio to take the Ohio bar examination. It is unreasonable to assume that the petitioner's five years of unrestricted legal experience, pursuant to Ohio's Registration Rule VI, is not equivalent to a nonresident applicant's legal experience elsewhere. As to the bar examination, if a nonresident attorney, with qualifying legal experience, does not have to take the Ohio bar examination, Ohio must be understood as stating that competency of an attorney is to be measured by either passing the bar examination or by possessing qualifying legal experience outside Ohio. Legal experience while a resident of Ohio is discounted without any articulated justification. There is no credible basis on which to support such discrimination. Indeed, the final step suggested by the *Jensen* court is satisfied because the discrimination imposed on the petitioner by Ohio bears no substantial relationship to the petitioner's competence or fitness to practice law in the State of Ohio. Therefore, applying the *Jensen* analysis, Ohio's Rule is an unconstitutional state action in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT PERPETUATES UNJUSTIFIABLE DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF A CLASS OF ATTORNEYS.

The rationale for the rule cited by the court below—encouraging corporate attorneys with less than five years of practice to take the bar and encouraging experienced attorneys to migrate to Ohio—does not relate to fitness

or competency to practice law and therefore cannot be used as a justification for a rule which discriminates against certain classes of attorneys.

The district court erroneouslv held that the Ohio Rule encourages corporate attorneys with less than five years of practice to take the bar examination. It is simply not the case that a federal or corporate attorney is encouraged to take the examination by a rule that waives the examination requirement. Perhaps the court was concerned that attorneys who are members of another state's bar (but with less than five years experience) would come into Ohio to practice for a corporation or the government and then go into private practice in Ohio. The court's concern for competence and fitness in those instances was misplaced. Those attorneys, like their counterparts coming in from out of state, would have passed an examination and would be members of a bar. Further, they would have been practicing law in Ohio under the direct supervision of the Ohio Supreme Court.

Under these circumstances, an argument that the Ohio Rule insures competency just does not wash. Absolutely no facts have been presented to demonstrate that attorneys practicing inside the state for a corporation or the government are less fit or competent than those practicing outside the state and that, therefore, one group should sit for an examination but the other group need not. The same standards must apply to both classes of attorneys. See *In re Griffiths*, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).

The conclusion below that the rule encourages experienced attorneys to migrate to Ohio is also without basis. Certainly, by making it more difficult for corporate and government attorneys to go into private practice in the State of Ohio, the rule reduces competition to the advantage of the local private bar. However, under *Schware*, the only legitimate reasons for denying admission are concerns about fitness and competency. Those concerns

have not been raised about either the petitioner or the class of attorneys involved. The court's rationale that the Ohio Rule is constitutional because it encourages migration of experienced attorneys to Ohio is irrelevant to the circumstances of this case.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT IMPAIRS THE EFFICIENT DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO CORPORATIONS THAT USE INSIDE COUNSEL AND TO THE GOVERNMENT.

The real effect of the lower court's decision upholding the Ohio Rule is to make it more difficult for qualified corporate and government counsel to fully and actively follow their chosen profession, to the detriment of those attorneys and their clients. The rule certainly discourages such attorneys from entering private practice. The rule also precludes them from participating in the professional activities provided by membership in a bar association. If an attorney cannot become a member of the bar association of the state in which he practices, the implication is that attorney is somehow not as professional as others.

Although that attorney can always take the bar examination, the fact remains that other attorneys no more or less competent are not required to do so for the sole reason that they happen to live on the other side of the state boundary. The result of this discriminatory treatment is to make it less attractive for competent attorneys who wish to fully participate in the professional activities afforded by bar membership to accept employment as attorneys with corporations or the government.

The Court should also recognize that the practice of corporate and government attorneys is often national in scope. Because of this national practice, military lawyers, other government lawyers and corporate attorneys often are assigned to perform legal duties outside the

states in which they have been licensed to practice. The prospect of such assignments, which depend on the needs of the government or the corporate employer, is a factor considered by lawyers who contemplate entering or remaining in the federal service or corporate employment. If, on the one hand, the lawyer who does legal work outside the jurisdiction in which licensed receives credit for the time spent in such work when seeking admission on motion to another state bar, then that attorney is not penalized for being assigned outside the state in which previously licensed. On the other hand, if this time is not credited for such purposes, the attorney is precluded from obtaining admission on motion. The practical consequence is that an attorney who leaves federal service or corporate employment through retirement or otherwise, would be prejudiced by remaining in the place of last assignment or employment if the years of practice in that jurisdiction could not count toward admission on motion to that state bar.

It appears to ACCA and the FBA that the real reason for the rule is to insulate the local bar from competition and thereby protect the economic interests of the local bar. This kind of economic restraint should not be countenanced by this Court. "Where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually *per se* rule of invalidity has been erected." *City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey*, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Restrictive bar admission requirements have been criticized by many commentators. Former American Bar Association President Chesterfield Smith has stated that "(m)any of the states that have erected fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their own lawyers from professional competition." *Time for a National Practice of Law Act*, 64 A.B.A.J. 557 (1978). See also Horack, *"Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions*, 28 J. Am. Judic. Soc. 102 (1944) ("an examination of requirements for admission to the bar shows a distinct

leaning toward the protection of the . . . local lawyer with much the same effect as is created by ordinary trade barriers"). This Court has overturned protectionist trade barriers in other situations. It is time for the Court to turn its attention to the equally restrictive burdens which the Ohio Rule places on the practice of law.

CONCLUSION

ACCA and the FBA recognize the legitimate interest of each state in assuring the fitness and competency of the attorneys who seek to become members of its bar. However, when a restriction goes beyond the state's legitimate interest and constructs a Chinese wall around the lawyers of that state, then the interests of the members of both associations are jeopardized. The restriction under attack here is clearly arbitrary, for it rests on the illogical premise that someone knows more about Ohio law by seeing it from a distance rather than close at hand. The associations support the Petition for Writ of Certiorari because of their conviction that the interests of their members and those of the public will be furthered if this Court directs a clear message to state bars and lower courts that arbitrary restrictions on bar admission cannot be tolerated. Restrictions such as those at issue deter some attorneys from federal and corporate service, punish others for serving nonetheless, and serve no valid state or public interest.

Dated this 21st day of September, 1984.

Respectfully submitted,

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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Is a rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio governing admission to the bar without examination rationally related to assuring attorney competency where, a) the rule excepts from its coverage the narrow class of attorneys in Ohio who, not having been admitted to the bar, are permitted to practice only on behalf of a single full time employer; b) the rule, designed to encourage immigration into Ohio of experienced attorneys from other states, credits only experience gained by such attorneys while outside Ohio and while therefore unable to sit for the Ohio bar examination without considerable inconvenience and expense; and c) the rule encourages inexperienced attorneys not admitted to the bar in Ohio and taking up a single-employer practice in Ohio to promptly take the Ohio bar examination to thereby demonstrate competency and become eligible for a wider practice?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 2

A. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW BY STATE SUPREME COURTS 2

B. RULE I, SECTION 9(A)(e) HAS A RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE GOAL OF ASSURING ATTORNEY COMPETENCE 3

C. RULE I, SECTION 9(A)(e) DOES NOT OFFEND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 5

CONCLUSION 7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Barry v. Barchi,
443 U.S. 55 (1979) 5

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) 5

Martin v. Walton,
368 U.S. 25 (1961) 6

McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) 6

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co .
449 U.S. 456 (1981) 6

Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957) 6

New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976) 6

Parham v. Hughes,
441 U.S. 347 (1979) 5

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957) 3, 5

Schweicker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221 (1981) 6

Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) 5

Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981) 6

Other Authorities:

Rule I, Section 9, Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio. 1, 2, 4, 5

Rule I, Section 9(A)(e), Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio. 3, 6

Rule VI(5), Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a portion of the rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio governing admission to the bar without examination, Rule I, Section 9, Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio. Contrary to Petitioner's statement, the rule is not designed to protect Ohio attorneys from competition, but rather to attract experienced attorneys to Ohio. More importantly, the rule is substantially related to assuring attorney competency. Section 9[1] provides that an attorney admitted to the bar of another state and of good moral character may be admitted into Ohio's bar without examination if, "while a nondomiciliary of Ohio and for at least five years, [he] engaged in legal work outside Ohio of such character and discription as shall satisfy this Court that the applicant possesses the legal skills deemed adequate for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination." The purpose of the "outside Ohio" requirement is to exclude non-admitted attorneys living and practicing in Ohio pursuant to Rule VI, Rules of the Government of the Bar,[2] which permits non-admitted attorneys to practice in Ohio "solely for his employer as a full-time employee," Rule VI(5).

Petitioner is such a non-admitted, single employer attorney practicing in Ohio who challenges his exclusion from admission without examination as a denial of equal protection. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected his challenge. This Court ought not to review the case, for the case does not present a novel or important issue of federal law, and was correctly decided below.

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[1]Rule 1, Section 9, is set out in full at page 3 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

[2]Rule VI is set out in full at page 5 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW BY STATE SUPREME COURTS.

It is important at the outset to dispel Petitioner's assertion that this case presents an issue of national importance in attorney regulatory matters. The bar regulatory rules at issue create a narrow exception to the basic requirement that attorneys pass a bar examination as a prerequisite to admission to practice in Ohio. Rule I, Section 9 exempts from the examination attorneys practicing outside Ohio and wishing to migrate to Ohio to practice if certain indicia of competence are present. The clear purpose of the rule is to attract such attorneys to Ohio. Ohio, therefore, has *not* embarked upon a program of discouraging immigration of attorneys so as to protect Ohio attorneys from competition. No constitutionally suspect parochialism is here present.

Rather, Petitioner complains that the exemption from examination is not broad enough—that it should extend beyond experienced attorneys in other states to include attorneys residing and lawfully practicing in Ohio although not admitted to the Ohio bar. His contention that the defined class is underinclusive is not therefore of major import to national legal affairs, but is more properly viewed as an attempt to invoke the Equal Protection Clause to fine tune Ohio's examination exemption requirement. This case is not, therefore, deserving of this Court's attention.

B. RULE I, SECTION 9(A)(e) HAS A RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE GOAL OF ASSURING ATTORNEY COMPETENCE.

In *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,* 353 U.S. 232 (1957), the Court held that bar admission criteria "must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law," *id.* at 239. As recognized by the lower courts, three such bases support Rule I, Section 9(A)(e).

As noted above, the Ohio rule credits, for the purpose of meeting the criterion of five years of legal work as a necessary experiential base, only legal work performed outside of Ohio, and does not "count" legal work performed in Ohio by a single employer attorney not admitted to the Ohio bar. This classification rests in part upon the differing breadth of legal experience acquired by each "class" of attorney. The class consisting of all attorneys practicing outside of Ohio includes attorneys with experience in all areas of the law and all types of legal work. By contrast, Petitioner's class of single employer attorneys practicing in Ohio is likely to have lesser breadth of experience. Such an attorney is most usually employed by a business entity and practices in areas relevant to the conduct of a commercial enterprise. He or she is not likely to encounter legal problems arising in such areas as criminal law, domestic relations, wills and estates, personal income and estate taxation, etc. These latter areas of practice most often reside with attorneys pursuing a multiple client private practice. Accordingly, it is fully rational not to give credit to the relatively narrower experience gained by Ohio "corporate attorneys," and to require such attorneys to demonstrate competence in all areas of law through examination prior to being licensed to practice in such areas.

Secondly, as noted above, the purpose of Rule I, Section 9 is to encourage immigration of experienced, capable attorneys into Ohio by relying upon their experience as indicative of competence rather than requiring successful completion of the bar examination. The waiving of the examination for such attorneys removes a requirement which is expensive and inconvenient for a non-resident attorney to fulfill. By contrast, an attorney such as Petitioner who resides and practices in Ohio need not first pass the bar examination to earn his livelihood, and is not confronted with the inconvenience of traveling to Ohio to prepare for and take the bar examination. Accordingly, it is rational to require an Ohio resident attorney to demonstrate fitness by passing the bar examination rather than to rely upon such attorney's legal experience as indicative of competence. Put simply, it is not irrational to require an Ohio attorney to take the Ohio bar examination as a prequisite to being licensed to undertake a broad practice in Ohio. Such a requirement is directly related to attorney competency.

The third rationale is discussed by the Sixth Circuit as follows, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A6:

> [T]he Ohio rule encourages attorneys who come into the state with less than five years of legal practice to take the bar immediately. Although the state will permit an attorney to practice law for a corporate employer without admission to the bar, concerns of knowledge and competency in Ohio law argue for a policy encouraging these corporate employees to take the bar exam soon after arrival in the state. A policy which would allow such attorneys to gain

> admission without examination after five years of practice would encourage them to practice without taking the bar, and this could have an adverse effect on the level of competence in corporate practice. A state's interest in regulating the practice of law within its borders is compelling, because lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice.

Petitioner takes issue with each of these bases. But surely they are not so lacking in merit as to be irrational. The lower courts properly concluded that Rule I, Section 9 is rationally related to assuring attorney competence.

C. RULE I, SECTION 9(A)(e) DOES NOT OFFEND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

The above discussion demonstrates that the distinction between all non-Ohio attorneys and Ohio corporate attorneys for bar examination purposes does not offend the Equal Protection Clause. A large measure of deference is due state bar rules due to a state's "compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries," *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,* 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Petitioner has not overcome the rule's presumption of validity, *Parham v. Hughes,* 441 U.S. 347 (1979); *Vance v. Bradley,* 440 U.S. 568 (1979); *Barry v. Barchi,* 443 U.S. 55 (1979), by demonstrating that the rule bears no rational relation to attorney competence, *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra.* Moreover, the rule may be struck down only if no conceivable, debatable rationale exists upon which the Supreme Court of Ohio *could* have

relied when promulgating the rule, *Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.*, 449 U.S. 456 (1981); *Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization*, 451 U.S. 648 (1981); *New Orleans v. Dukes*, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); *McGowan v. Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); *Morey v. Doud*, 345 U.S. 457 (1957). And even if the classification is not perfect, and has an inequitable application to an individual litigant, the rule must be sustained if rationally applicable to the distinguished classes as a whole, *Schweicker v. Wilson*, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); *Martin v. Walton*, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).

Applying these equal protection doctrines to Rule I, Section 9(A)(e), it is apparent that the rule passes muster. The three bases identified above are fully adequate to support the rule. Accordingly, there is no purpose served in this Court's review of this case.

CONCLUSION

This petition presents no reason warranting review by this Court. Petitioner has identified no conflict among state supreme courts or federal appellate courts on this issue. No important or novel issue of federal law is presented. Even within the narrow field of state regulation of the practice of law, this case does not present an issue of any great significance. Rather, this case is a straightforward adjudication employing a clearly-established equal protection analysis, and was correctly decided below. The petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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No. 84-298

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, II,
Petitioner,

vs.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, and CHIEF JUSTICE FRANK CELEBREZZE, JUSTICE CLIFFORD BROWN, JUSTICE WILLIAM BROWN, JUSTICE ROBERT HOLMES, JUSTICE JAMES CELEBREZZE, JUSTICE RALPH LOCHER, JUSTICE A. WILLIAM SWEENEY,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

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REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

Petitioner would like to briefly make a number of points in response to Respondents' Brief in Opposition.

First: The fact that the American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) and the Federal Bar Association (FBA) have chosen to file an amicus brief belies Respondents' claim that this is an issue of little importance. These two organizations together represent some 20,000 attorneys and certainly they would not have filed an amicus brief had they felt this issue to be trivial.

Second: Respondents persist in comparing the wrong classes of attorneys. The Ohio Rule permits the admission without examination of all corporate and federal attorneys who have practiced law for five years and have been admitted to the bar of another state except for those attorneys who have lived or practiced in Ohio for any portion of those five years. Respondents have made no effort to explain why this distinction has been made between different portions of the class of corporate and federal attorneys. Without a rational basis for that distinction the Rule is defective under the Equal Protection Clause.

Third: Respondents continue to claim that corporate attorneys have less breadth of practice than do private attorneys. That, of course, is a factual question that should not be resolved without a hearing. Furthermore, and more importantly, Respondents are clearly wrong when they imply that a typical private attorney is knowledgeable in "criminal law, domestic relations, will and estates, personal income and estate taxation, etc." (Brief in Opposition at 3). The vast majority of attorneys specialize, and, if anything, corporate attorneys probably have a broader range of practice than do private attorneys. (See Petition for Certiorari at 8 for a description of Petitioner's experience.)

Fourth: The sole goal of Rule I(9)(e) is to discourage corporate and federal attorneys domiciled or working in Ohio from moving into the private bar, while at the same time permitting attorneys who are currently members of the Ohio bar to freely move to another state. If Ohio would not allow foreign attorneys to enter the Ohio bar without taking the Ohio bar examination then other states would set up similar barriers to members of the Ohio bar. Thus, Rule I(9) is designed to permit Ohio attorneys to easily emigrate while subsection (e) was

added in order to protect the local bar from competition from corporate and federal attorneys already resident in the state.

To conclude, Respondents and the lower courts have not been able to concoct any competency-related rationale for the existence of Rule I(9)(e) that meets any version of the rational basis test. That Rule is designed solely to restrict competition and is violative of the equal protection clause since it permits some experienced attorneys to be admitted to the bar without taking the bar examination while it arbitrarily and capriciously denies that privilege to others.

Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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